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2023 Supreme(Online)(Del) 17094
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
C. Hari Shankar, J
LOUIS VUITTON MALLETIER – Appellant
Versus
CAPITAL GENERAL STORE & ORS. – Respondent
CS(COMM) 469/2021
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Mr. Pravin Anand, Mr. Dhruv Anand, Ms. Nimrat Singh
For the Respondents: Mr. Kailash Sharma, Ms. Nishi Jain, Mr. Birender Bhatt, Mr. Rakesh Kumar
Violations of interim orders are serious and must be punished to uphold the rule of law and deter future breaches.
Headnote:(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXXIX Rule 2A - Application for contempt of court - The court emphasizes that violations of interim orders must be taken seriously, asserting the need for punishment to deter future violations. The Supreme Court decisions reinforce that breach must be viewed strictly to maintain the rule of law. (Paras 1-3)
(B) Counterfeiting - The court discusses the implications of counterfeiting, highlighting that it undermines both brand integrity and consumer trust, constituting a serious commercial offense. The defense's plea for leniency is countered by the plaintiff's argument for strict punishment to uphold brand value. (Paras 8, 12, 26)
(C) Judicial discretion - The court clarifies the boundaries of its discretion under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, reaffirming that penalties must be proportionate to the seriousness of the contempt, while also recognizing the necessity for courts to send a clear message against counterfeiting. (Paras 27-30)
| Table of Content |
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| 1. emphasizes the necessity for strict enforcement of interim injunctions. (Para 1 , 2 , 3) |
| 2. clarifies judicial discretion regarding contempt and the necessity for deterrence. (Para 4 , 25 , 26) |
| 3. discusses the serious ramifications of counterfeiting on brand value and consumer trust. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 12) |
| 4. determines the penalty for contempt based on the breach's seriousness and proportionality. (Para 28 , 30 , 31) |
JUDGMENT
06.02.2023
I.A. 15066/2022 (under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC) in CS(COMM) 469/2021
1. Interlocutory orders of injunction are passed by this Court, on a daily basis, in intellectual property matters. The Court finds itself faced, in several such cases, with applications under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), by plaintiffs complaining that the defendants have violated the interim order of injunction. In many such cases – as in the present – the allegation is found to be true. The violation, however, generally stops on or before the date when the court issues notice on the application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A. The plaintiff, however, insists, and not without Justification, that the defendant cannot be let off. A violator, asserts the plaintiff, is a violator, and deserves to be punished. The Supreme Court echoes this sentiment, in para 54 of Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu , [(2015) 5 SCC 450]
―54. As has been held in Arathi Bandi v. Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao , [(2013) 15 SCC 790], a violation of an interim or an interlocutory order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction ought to be viewed strictly if the rule of law is to be maintained. No litigant can be permitted to defy or decline adherence to an interim or an interlocutory order of a court merely because he or she is of the opinion that that order is incorrect—that has to be judged by a superior court or by another court having jurisdiction to do so. It is in this context that the observations of this Court in Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma, [(2000) 3 SCC 14] and Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo, [(2011) 6 SCC 479], have to be appreciated. If as a general principle, the violation of an interim or an interlocutory order is not viewed seriously, it will have widespread deleterious effects on the authority of courts to implement their interim or interlocutory orders or compel their adherence.‖
Order XXXIX Rule 2A vis-à-vis contempt of court
2. There is a divergence of opinion, in judgments of the Supreme Court, on whether Order XXXIX Rule 2A confers, or does not confer, a power of contempt, and also, therefore, whether the disobedience which would invite punitive action under the said provision has necessarily to be willful. Food Corporation of India v. Sukh Deo Prasad, [ Veri5f i(e2d009) 5 SCC 665] and U.C. Surendranath v. Mambally’s Bakery , [(2019) 20 SCC 666] hold in the affirmative, thus:
Food Corporation of India5
―38. The power exercised by a court under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 . The person who complains of disobedience or breach has to clearly make out beyond any doubt that there was an injunction or order directing the person against whom the application is made, to do or desist from doing some specific thing or act and that there was disobedience or breach of such order. While considering an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A, the court cannot construe the order in regard to which disobedience/breach is alleged, as creating an obligation to do something which is not mentioned in the ―order‖, on surmises, suspicions and inferences. The power under Rule 2-A should be exercised with great caution and responsibility.‖
U.C. Surendranath6
―7. For finding a person guilty of wilful disobedience of the order under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC there has to be not mere ―disobedience‖ but it should be a ―wilful disobedience‖. The allegation of wilful disobedience being in the nature of criminal liability
