Fraud claims must be supported by specific evidence, and delay in asserting such claims can bar relief under limitation laws.

JDGMENT

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

1. The present Writ Petition is filed impugning Order dated 16.05.2025, [Impugned Order] passed by the learned Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal-I, Delhi, [DRAT], whereby the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the Appeal, against the judgment dated 09.03.2010 passed by learned Debt Recovery Tribunal-I, Delhi, [DRT], before it was rejected, which led to the Appeal to be dismissed on the ground of being time-barred. The said Appeal was filed on 27.10.2023, being Appeal No.360 of 2023 arising out of O.A. No.13 of 2007, along with application being I.A. No.875 of 2023 seeking condonation of delay of more than 13 years in filing the said Appeal.

2. Being a trivial controversy here, an elaborate exposition of the factual matrix involved would not be required. The issue in brief is whether or not an Appeal which has been admittedly filed more than 13 years after passing of the Impugned Order therein could have been entertained by the learned DRAT as against the expressed stipulation of statute meaning thereby Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, [RDB Act], and on the principle that stands espoused by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments that “Fraud Vitiates Everything” CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS

3. The first contention of the Petitioners is that the judgement dated 09.03.2010 of the learned DRT was a result of fraud that was played upon the Court and, resultantly, the same is a nullity and, the Appeal against the Judgment, which was a nullity, would not be barred by limitation and would thus be maintainable requiring a determination of the said Appeal on merits.

4. It is the contention of the Petitioners that the loan which was advanced by Respondent No.1-Bank to the Appellant was based on collusion between one Mr. G.S. Saluja, being Respondent No.2 herein and Respondent No.1-Bank.

5. It is further contended by the Petitioners that the said loan was based on a Board Resolution dated 08.01.2004, which was unauthorised, as it was limited only for the purposes of Domestic Working Capital, whereas the loan was granted for Export Credit. Moreover, the Petitioners submit that the Export Credit as granted was for the purpose of garment exports to manufacturers only, and the Petitioners herein are not manufacturers, thereby disentitling them from any loan for garment export.

6. It is further submitted by Petitioners that the loan transaction is a fraudulent transaction from its very inception, and any enforcement of such a transaction is a nullity in the eyes of the law, being void ab initio.

7. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further contends that the fraud is apparent from the documents, being the Bill of Exchange dated 18.03.2004, the Loan Sanction Letter and the alleged concealed documents.

8. Learned counsel for the Petitioners thereafter relies upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.V. Papayya Sastry & Ors vs Government of A.P. & Ors, [2007 (4) SCC 221]., and in particular paragraphs Nos. 21-27, which are reproduced herein below:

“21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:

“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”

22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.

23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 All ER 341: (1956) 1 QB 702: (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] Lord Denning observed: (All ER p. 345 C)

“No judgment of a court, no order of a