Judicial interference in arbitral awards is limited, emphasizing respect for the arbitrator's findings unless there's substantive evidence of legal violation.

JUDGMENT

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

1. The present Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, [A&C Act.] and Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 raises a challenge to Order dated 19.04.2024, [Impugned Order] passed by learned District Judge (Commercial Court-01), District South, Saket Courts, New Delhi, in OMP (Comm.) No. 33/2023, in a Petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act, titled as Sahib Sital Singh Bajwa & Ors. v. Aakash Educational Services Ltd. & Anr., confirming the Award dated 09.02.2023 and correction Order dated 06.03.2023 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator in Arbitration Case No. 06/07/2020.

2. Shorn of all details, the present Appeal is premised on the pointed contention that the Impugned Order is liable to be set aside on the ground that it failed to consider the significant fact of the Award having been pronounced after a considerable delay.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS:

3. Learned counsel for the Appellants contends that the jurisdiction of arbitration was invoked on 23.05.2020 and that the Tribunal was thereafter constituted on 29.06.2020. It is submitted that Section 29A of the A&C Act stipulates that the entire arbitral proceedings ought to have been concluded within a period of one year. However, in the present case, the proceedings have taken almost two and a half years to conclude, without any extension or permission having been sought from the Court. It is, therefore, submitted that the Award stands vitiated, having been rendered in violation of the express provisions of Section 29A of the A&C Act.

4. During the course of arguments, the Bench drew the attention of the learned counsel for the Appellants to the Order dated 10.01.2022 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, [(2022) 3 SCC 117.], whereby the time period under Section 29A of the A&C Act was expressly suspended by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The relevant excerpt from the aforesaid Order dated 10.01.2022 is as follows:

5 (IV). “It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.”

(Emphasis supplied)

5. Learned counsel for the Appellants, upon a perusal of paragraph 5 of the aforesaid order, sought leave to withdraw the present Appeal, albeit with a caveat that liberty be reserved in favour of the Appellants to suitably amend and re-present the Appeal under Section 37 of the A&C Act.

6. This Court, by that time, had already heard the learned counsel for the Appellants at considerable length and was of the opinion that the matter can be heard and decided.

7. Apart from the point of limitation; the challenge to the Impugned Order and the Award rested primarily on the contention that the underlying contract was itself unenforceable and contrary to the express provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

8. Learned counsel for the Appellants further submitted that the terms and conditions of the Contract were ex facie one-sided, and as a consequence, the performance thereof imposed an undue and onerous burden upon the Appellants, culminating in substantial losses. It was, thus, urged that, on this ground as well, both the Impugned Order and the Award warranted interference and ought to be set aside.

9. Learned counsel for the Appellants also made a categorical statement that the evidence which has been rendered by the Appellants has not been taken into consideration while passing the Award as well as the Order impugned herein.

10. Learned counsel for the Appellants further submitted that the period affected