$~26 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CRL.L.P. 344/2022 STATE .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP for the State with Mr. Lalit Luthra and Mr. Vinesh Kumar, Advs. with SI Preeti Ahlawat, PS Begumpur.

versus SANTOSH .....Respondent Through: Mr. Shubham Asri, Adv.

(through VC)

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

O R D E R

% 14.11.2025

1. The present petition is filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) seeking leave to challenge the judgment dated 01.12.2021 (hereafter ‘impugned judgment’) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, North-West District, Rohini Courts, Delhi in Case No. 349/2017 whereby the respondent was acquitted of the offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Sections 9(m)/10/11(i)/12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012(‘POCSO Act’).

2. Briefly stated, the respondent was a juice seller, who used to sell juice from a wooden cart. It is alleged that when the victim was having a glass of juice from his wooden cart, the respondent allegedly told the victim that he likes her and asked her to give him a kiss. Thereafter, the respondent allegedly started touching the victim inappropriately on her waist and stomach. Further, it is alleged that when the victim told the respondent that she would disclose his acts to her mother, the respondent threatened her to not tell her mother about the incident or else he would beat her.

3. The Learned Trial Court framed charges under Sections 506 of the IPC and Sections 9(m)/10/11(i)/12 of the POCSO Act against the respondent to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

4. The learned Trial Court, by the impugned judgment, acquitted the respondent of the charged offences and noted that multiple material contradictions and inconsistencies existed in the statements of the victim and her mother.

5. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor (‘APP’) for the State submits that the impugned judgement is based on presumptions, conjectures and surmises, devoid of merits and as such cannot prima facie stand and thus, deserves to be set aside. He submits that the learned Trial Court erred in not considering that evidence of the victim alone is sufficient to convict the accused in POCSO cases.

6. He submits that the learned Trial Court failed to draw the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act against the respondent and further ignored the law that it is for the accused to rebut the said presumption.

7. He submits that the learned Trial Court ignored that Section 30 of POCSO Act permits the Special Court to presume for any offence under the Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the existence of such mental state.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the accused/respondent vehemently opposes the arguments as raised by the learned APP for the State and consequently prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

9. It is trite law that this Court must exercise caution and should only interfere in an appeal against acquittal where there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. At the stage of grant of leave to appeal, the High Court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out in favour of the appellant or if such arguable points have been raised which would merit interference. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar: (2008) 9 SCC 475 held as under:

“19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that no appeal “shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of Session to file an application for leave to appeal as required by sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be registered and heard on merits by the High Court only after the High Court grants leave b