$~3 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + ARB.P. 1449/2025 VINOD KUMAR .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Vikas Tomar Advocate versus MEENAL HOUSING PVT. LTD. .....Respondent Through: Mr. Sushil Aggarwal and Mr. Divyam Aggarwal, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

O R D E R

% 13.11.2025

1. This is a petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) seeking appointment of an Arbitrator.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner booked one studio apartment bearing no. SA-1001, 10th Floor, in Tower A, Semeion, Sector – 41, Faridabad (“flat”) and the parties entered into a Studio Apartment Purchase Agreement dated 30.03.2016.

3. The petitioner paid the entire sale consideration, but the respondent failed to deliver possession within the agreed 36 months. Despite repeated requests, the respondent only offered possession for fit out purposes in July 2023 and has not executed the conveyance deed while allegedly renting the flat to third parties.

4. The Studio Apartment Purchase Agreement contains an Arbitration Clause, being Clause 14, which reads as under:

“14. Arbitration and Disputes i) That in case of any dispute(s) between the company and the Allottee(s) on any of the matter(s) or issue(s) pertaining to the subject matter of this Agreement or interpretation of any term of this Agreement the same shall be referred for adjudication in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the sole arbitrator to be appointed by the Company. The award given by the arbitrator thereupon shall be final and binding on both the parties.

ii) That the Courts in Delhi alone shall have the exclusive jurisdiction.”

5. Due to the disputes between the parties, the petitioner invoked Arbitration on 04.04.2025 and thereafter filed the present petition.

6. Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the respondent, states that the present petition is misconceived as the power of attorney in favour of Mr. Bantoo Sharma is not apostilled. Additionally, he states that no notice under Section 21 of the Act has been received by the respondent, as the same was sent to the earlier address of the respondent.

7. He further states that the respondent has disputes with both the Faridabad Municipal Corporation and the builder, and that, upon payment of the dues, the respondent is ready and willing to execute the conveyance deed.

8. As far as the first objection is concerned, the document has been notarized by the Notary Public in Auckland, New Zealand. In Kamla Rani v. Texmaco Ltd., 2007 SCC OnLine Del 128 the Court held as under:

“33. Authentication by a notary public is a solemn act performed by the notary public whose duty is to ensure that the executant is the person before him and is identified to his satisfaction. Once a document is authenticated by a notary public, it will be presumed that the document was duly executed and was in order. The use of the expression ‘shall presume’ shows that the section is mandatory and the Court has to presume that all necessary requirements for the proper execution of the power of attorney were duly fulfilled before the notary public. As observed in AIR 1984 (363) (sic) E. C. and E.Co. Ltd. v. J. E. Works, if two conditions are satisfied, firstly the power of attorney being executed before a notary public and secondly it being authenticated by a notary public, a presumption would arise under Section 85 about the executant of the power of attorney.”

9. Similarly, in National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. World Science News, 1976 SCC OnLine Del 8 it was held as under:

“10. The document in the present case is a power of attorney and again on the face of it shows to have been executed before, and authenticated by, a notary public. In view of Section 85 of the Evidence Act, the Court has to presume that it was so executed and authenticated. Once the original document is produced purporting to be a power of attorney so executed and attested, as stated in S. 85 of the Evidence Act,