$~24 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CRL.L.P. 409/2018 & CRL.M.A. 11819/2018 CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, SPP with Mr. Kushagra Kumar and Mr. Amit Kumar Rana, Advocates.

versus NIRMAL SINGH .....Respondent Through: Mr. Rajeev Chhibber, Ms.

Kiran Saini, Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

O R D E R

% 07.11.2025

1. The present petition is filed under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) seeking leave to challenge the judgment dated 08.09.2017 (hereafter ‘impugned judgment’) passed by the learned Trial Court in CC No.

05/2025.

2. By the impugned judgment, the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondent of the offences under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘PC Act’).

3. Briefly stated, the present case was registered on the basis of a complaint alleging that the respondent being SI, Operation Cell, Delhi Police demanded Rs.1,00,000/- from the complainant for settlement of a complaint case against the complainant. The petitioner Department laid a trap, during which the accused was allegedly caught accepting a bribe of Rs. 70,000/-. Charges were framed against the respondent for offences under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 08.09.2017 acquitted the respondent of the charged offences.

4. At the very outset, this Court finds it apposite to deal with the application for condonation of delay filed by the petitioner Department under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 205 days in filing the present leave to appeal.

5. The learned standing counsel for the petitioner Department submits that the delay in filing the present leave to appeal was due to administrative delays.

6. He further submits that the procedural formalities required to be fulfilled by the petitioner department entailed multiple departments and approvals at various levels which cumulatively led to a delay of 205 days in preferring the present leave to appeal.

7. The petitioner has further produced a table enumerating reasons for the delay in filing the present petition. The same is reproduced below:

8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed the condonation of delay application preferred by the petitioner Department. He submits that the Leave to Appeal was filed belatedly and the Department has furnished no proper explanation for the delay apart from vague assertions of administrative issues. He further submits that the cause for each day of delay ought to be explained and the intent of the petitioner Department is to just keep the litigation alive for years.

9. The Hon’ble Apex Court has frowned upon following of such practices by the Government departments. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. : (2012) 3 SCC 563, had held that the Government cannot claim to have a separate period of limitation when the Department is possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. The delay cannot be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before the Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court had rejected the claim on account of impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology of making several notes in view of the modern technologies be