Constructive res judicata precludes a party from re-litigating issues they could have raised in earlier proceedings under relevant statutes.

1. The appellant landlord failed both before the Controller and in the first appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal to obtain an order of eviction against the respondents on the ground that the tenants Respondents 1 to 3 have sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of a part of the premises to Respondent No.4, their sub-tenant, within the meaning of proviso (b) to S.14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) which runs as follows: -
"(b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord".

2. The reasons why the application for eviction was dismissed by the Controller and the dismissal was upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal in the first appeal were as follows: -
(1) The landlord was barred by constructive res judicata from making the application for the eviction of the respondents under proviso (b) to S.14(1) of the Act, and
(2) Respondent No.4 was in possession of a part of the premises from before 1-3-1956 when the premises were let by the landlord to the Respondents 1 to 3 and, therefore, it could not be said that the Respondents 1 to 3 sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of a part of the premises to Respondent No.4 within the meaning of proviso (b) to S.14(1) of the Act.

3. Hence this second appeal by the landlord under S.39 of the Act. The landlord has challenged the correctness of both the reasons given above for the dismissal of his application for eviction of the respondents. Let us, therefore, re - examine their correctness.

4. Constructive res judicata: -
In 1960 the landlord had filed a petition for the eviction of Respondents 1 to 3 alone on the ground that they were using the premises contrary to a condition contained in the lease on which the land of the premises was held by the landlord within the meaning of proviso (k) to S.14(1) of the Act. Respondent No.4 was not joined as a party to the said petition for eviction. Later the landlord applied for amendment of the application for eviction on another ground for the eviction of Respondents 1 to 3, namely, the subletting of a part of the premises by them to Respondent No.4. This application for amendment was however dismissed by the Controller who observed that the ground under proviso (b) was an independent one implying perhaps that a separate application for eviction could be brought thereunder. The application under proviso (k) was also dismissed on merits.

5. The various provisos to S.14(1) of the Act enumerate the various grounds on which the eviction of the tenant can be sought by the landlord. The object of the eviction petition is a single one, namely, the eviction of the tenant. To achieve this single end these various grounds are available to the landlord. Each of these grounds may be said to be independent of each other insofar as each constitutes a separate cause of action. Order II, R.2(1) Civil Procedure Code only requires that the plaintiff shall include the whole of the claim which he is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action in every suit. It does not, therefore, seem to require that the landlord must plead in the same eviction petition all the grounds available to him under the various provisos to S.14(1) on the date of the filing of the petition for eviction. But Explanation IV to S.11 is stricter than Order II, R.2(1) Civil Procedure Code. According to Explanation IV to S.11 "any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of d