1976 Supreme(Online)(Del) 6
DELHI HIGH COURT
T.P.S. Chawla, J
Ex-Servicemen Enterprises (P.) Ltd M/s. v. Sumey Singh
Specific Performance Suit
In specific performance cases, a clear claim for possession is mandatory under S.22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Headnote:The plaintiff sought specific performance and possession of agricultural land as agreed in a compromise. The court analyzed the requirement under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, particularly S.22, which necessitates a claim for possession in specific performance suits. The court held that the prayer for possession was essential and valid, thus decreeing the suit for possession and performance of the contract as per the original compromise.
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| 1. plaintiff sought specific performance for land sale. (Para 2 , 3 , 4 , 5) |
| 2. defendant raised technical objections. (Para 6 , 7 , 12 , 17 , 22) |
| 3. amendment for possession was allowed. (Para 10 , 14 , 19) |
| 4. court emphasized necessity of possession in performance. (Para 15 , 18 , 25) |
| 5. court decreed possession along with performance. (Para 27 , 29 , 30) |
1. This judgment is by way of postscript.
2. On January 18, 1971, the plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance against the defendant. Specific performance was sought in respect of agricultural land measuring 48 bighas and 10 biswas owned by the defendant in village Khampur, Sub-Tehsil Mehrauli. The defendant had agreed to sell the land to the plaintiff. As he did not convey the property the plaintiff brought the suit.
3. On November 1, 1973, before T.P.S. Chawla J. the parties reached a compromise. The terms were reduced to writing. The suit was decreed in terms of the compromise.
4. The term of the compromise was that the plaintiff will pay Rs. 50,000 over the original agreed price of Rupees 66,100 which he had already paid to the defendant. The total consideration for the sale of the property was therefore agreed at Rs. 1,16,100 at the time of the compromise.
5. In terms of the compromise the plaintiff deposited Rs. 50,000 in the Reserve Bank of India on December 25, 1973. But the defendant did not deliver possession of land agreed to be sold.
6. The plaintiff - decree - holder made an application for the execution of the decree (I. A. 1779 of 1974) and the execution proceedings started. In his application the plaintiff sought possession of the land.
7. The defendant's principal objection to the delivery of possession was that there was no claim for possession in the original plaint and there was no decree for possession against him. He, therefore, said that there cannot be an order for delivery of possession.
8. In the original plaint the plaintiff's claim was in these words:
" a decree directing the sale of the land in his favour be passed against the defendant .. .. "
9. Chawla J. recorded the statements of the parties. Both of them agreed that a decree may be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant. The only essential term of the compromise was, as I have said, that the consideration was Rs. 1,16,100 instead of Rs. 66,100. Chawla J. decreed the suit on November 1, 1973 in terms of the compromise.
10. On January 14, 1975, the plaintiff moved an application for the amendment of the original plaint (I. A. 166 of 1975). He sought leave to add the following: -
"The plaintiff be also granted a decree for possession of the suit land and the possession of the same be delivered to him."
11. Since the relief of possession was not included in the original plaint this was now sought to be added by way of amendment. The defendant opposed this application. I allowed the amendment of the plaint on May 23, 1975 (Reported in AIR 1976 Delhi 56 ).
12. The defendant appealed to the Division Bench against my order dated May 23, 1975. The Division Bench by order dated July 23, 1975 said that apart from the fact that the impugned order was not appealable, "we see no ground to interfere on merits". The appeal was dismissed at a preliminary hearing.
13. The defendant has now filed the written statement to the amended plaint. He has verbatim reproduced all the defences which he originally took. The only new thing which he has said in the written statement is in paragraph 2 of his preliminary objections where the following words appear which were not there in the original written statement:
"The plaintiff has now added the prayer of possession."
14. Therefore it comes to this. The suit for specific performance was compromised between the parties. The plaintiff had omitted to ask for the relief of possession. Under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 S.22 makes it incumbent on a plaintiff to ask for possession of the property in addition to specific performance. Sub-section (