The eligibility criterion of 50% marks for LL.B. entrance is arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 21, infringing on the right to education as part of personal liberty.

1. Rule D. B.

2. By consent of parties, we have heard the matter on merits.

3. By this writ petition, Jayashree Ravi and Anil Kaushal question the legality and vires of a condition imposed by the University of Delhi in the matter of eligibility of the persons to take an entrance examination for the 3 Year LL.B. course conducted by the University of Delhi through its Law Faculty.

4. It is stated in the petition that Jayashree Ravi did obtain a degree in B.A. from the University of Delhi (10+2+3) scheme in the year 1983, having passed the B.A. examination in the third division.

5. It is also stated in the petition that Anil Kaushal did obtain B.Com. (Pass) degree in the Year 1980, having passed the examination held for that purpose by the University of Delhi, in the third division.

6. Jayashree Ravi holds a degree dated 24-03-1984, and Anil Kaushal holds a degree dated 28-02-1991.

7. It is stated in the petition that on 22-06-1992, the respondent University issued an advertisement in the local newspaper declaring that there will be a test for admission to the LL.B. Three Year Degree Course for the Academic year 1992-93, and that the same was open only to candidates who have passed Masters / B.A. Degree examination securing at least 50% in the aggregate. The last date for receipt of application was fixed as 17-07-1992, and the date of admission test was fixed as 26-7-1992. On 18-07-1992, however, the last date was extended to 25-07-1992, and the date of the entrance examination was changed to 02-08-1992. The petitioners state that inasmuch as the condition of 50% marks in the aggregate was illegal, arbitrary, irrational, and that their application for taking the examination was likely to be rejected, they instituted the instant civil writ petition, questioning the eligibility condition of 50% aggregate marks in the B.A. examination, asserting that such a condition denies them a chance to study the LL.B. course in violation of their fundamental rights, and in violation of the provisions of Art. 14 and Art. 21 of the Constitution.

8. In the petition it is asserted that the petitioners rights under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution were violated by the aforesaid eligibility requirement of 50% marks in the B.A. examination. It is also asserted that the said condition was without any intelligible differentia, and that the said condition did not have any relationship or nexus to any object which is sought to be achieved.

9. The meaning of, and the content of the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution have undergone a considerable change, as is apparent from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court. These changes were noted in the judgment reported as Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , AIR 1978 SC 597 . The meaning of life and personal liberty has been further enlarged in the case reported as Bandhua Mukti Moraha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 : 1984 Lab IC 560. Now in a case Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka , reported as 1992 (4) JT SC 292 : AIR 1992 SC 1858 (Kulidip Singh and R. M. Sahai, JJ.), the Supreme Court has held that right to education is one of the rights to personal liberty and life ensured by Art. 21 of the Constitution.

10. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (supra) the question was whether an order passed under S.10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 was violative of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as also violative of Art. 19(1)(a) or (g) of the Constitution. Justice Bhagwati with whom other Judges had concurred, said that, "it is not a valid argument to say that the expression personal liberty in Art. 21 must be so