A trespasser whose license has expired cannot seek an injunction against the true owner, affirming established legal principles regarding possession and relief.

1The plaintiffs the appellant in Suit No. 1693/95. This appeal is preferred against the order in IA 7540 of 1995 and IA 7930 of 1995 dated 8-11-1995 vacating the temporary injunction granted earlier on 24-7-1995.

2. The facts of the case are as follows :
The appellant Corporation wanted to run a liquor shop and gave an advertisement on 16-4-1982 inviting tenders from owners of shops for entering into a 'licence' agreement. The respondent - owners submitted their offers and the said offer was accepted by the appellant on 3-5-1982. Thereafter a licence deed was executed on 5-5-1982 whereby the appellant agreed to pay certain percentage as compensation with a minimum guarantee of Rs. 6,000/- p.m. The licence was to be up to 31-3-1983. It was continued up to 31-3-1984. On 1-6-1984, appellant wrote to the owners inquiring if the respondent would allow appellant to continue till 31-3-1985. By letter dated 22-11-1984, the appellant wrote to respondent that it would increase the, commission at 10% of gross profit with a minimum of Rs. 4,000/- p.m. w.e.f. 1.4,1984. On 13-6-1986, appellant wrote to respondent agreeing to pay a percentage of its gross profits for the year 1986-87. On 18-8-1987, appellant wrote to respondent that w.e.f. 1-41987, it would pay compensation at 12.5% subject to a minimum of Rs. 6000/- p.m. On 19-9-1991 appellant wrote to respondent that its sales have comedown and that respondent should accept whatever appellant could pay. On 13-1-1992, appellant wrote to respondent declining to enhance compensation from 12.5% to 15% with a minimum of Rs. 16,000/-. Appellant was prepared to pay only 12-5%.

3. On 14-1-1992, respondent wrote to appellant that in view of the delay from August 1991 to January 1992 in responding to the request of the respondent for enhancing the compensation, the appellant is directed to vacate by 15-2-1992. Appellant wrote on 13-2-1992 requesting to be "allowed to operate its L - 2 ven till 31st March, 1992" as the licence from Excise Department is current upto 31-31992. In other words, the appellant agreed to vacate by 31-3-1992.

4. On 14-2-1992, 16-3-1992, 24-5-1992, 18-5-1992, 9-6-1992 and 21-7-1992, the defendant - respondent asked the appellant to vacate and clear its stocks, as agreed in the appellant's letter dated 13-2-1992.

5. Instead of vacating the premises on 31-3-1992 as agreed above, the appellant continued to occupy the premises without acceding to the repeated reminders by the respondent. Thereafter, there were disputes during 1993 because of disconnection of water - supply and electricity. These continued during 1994-95. Then the appellant filed the present suit in 1995 and obtained temporary injunction on 24-7-1995 restraining the respondent from evicting the appellant. Under the impugned order, the injunction has been vacated.

6. In the suit, the appellant has contended that it is a tenant and not a licensee and that the nomenclature employed in the agreement is not decisive. It may here be noted that the appellant corporation itself invited tenders from owner for a licence and not for a lease.

7. The learned trial Judge said that he was inclined to accept the case of the defendant that plaintiff was only a licensee and that the license stood revoked. It was not a case of a licence coupled with interest. The learned Judge stressed on the fact that while inviting tenders, the appellant corporation had itself desired to enter into a 'licence'. On the question of alleged - threats of forcible eviction, the learned Judge said that this was not plausible because on 5-4-1995, the respondent wrote to the appellant that