The bank's claim of lien on fixed deposits requires express contractual basis; mere invocation is insufficient without evidence.

1. The present Revision Petition, under S.58 (1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (for short the Act) has been filed by the Petitioner (hereinafter called the Bank) against the dated 16.8.2019 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijaywada, Andhra Pradesh (for short the State Commission) in Appeal No. 536 of 2016. The said Appeal filed against the order dated 30.9.2016 of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum - I, Visakhapatnam (for short the District Forum) in Complaint No. 45 of 2016 was dismissed.

2. The impugned order has been challenged before me on the ground that the findings of the Foras below are perverse as the Foras below have ignored the fact that the Bank had a right of lien on all the properties lying with it of the debtor against any loan amount due towards the borrower, irrespective of the fact that whether the property had been pledged or not. It is submitted that the Foras below have wrongly interpreted S.171 of the Contract Act and ignored Clause 14 of the Hypothecation Letter signed by the borrower / Petitioner when the loan was sanctioned.

3. This Commission has a very limited revisional jurisdiction. It is not required to re - assess and re - appreciate the evidences on record and substitute with its own conclusion on facts, especially when the findings on facts are concurrent. This Commission can interfere with the concurrent findings of the Foras below only when there is perversity in the order or where there is a wrong exercise of jurisdiction. A finding can be said to be perverse finding when it is based on no evidences where the material piece of evidence on record has not been considered. It has been so held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rubi (Chandra) Dutta v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., II (2011) CPJ 19 (SC):IV (2011) SLT 303:(2011) 11 SCC 269, has held as under:
23. Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from S.21(b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two Forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the Courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under S.21(b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two Fora.

4. Again in Lourdes Society Snehanjali Girls Hostel and Ors. v. H&R Johnson (India) Ltd. and Others, III (2016) CPJ 27 (SC):VI (2016) SLT 86:(2016) 8 SCC 286, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle and has held as under:
17. The National Commission has to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it only if the State Commission or the District Forum has either failed to exercise their jurisdiction or exercised when the same was not vested in them or exceeded their jurisdiction by acting illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, the National Commission has certainly exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the concurrent finding of fact recorded in the order passed by the State Commission which is based upon valid and cogent reasons.

5. In T. Ramal