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2025 Supreme(Online)(Del) 40209

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
JYOTI SINGH, J
JAGDAMBEY BUILDERS PVT LTD – Appellant
Versus
JATINDER SINGH VOHRA – Respondent
CS(OS) 717/2015



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Mr. Mayank Bansal
For the Respondents: Mr. Dhruv Chawla

A suit for specific performance must be filed within three years of the date fixed for performance or the date of notice of refusal. Initiation of recovery or eviction proceedings by the owner serves as clear notice of refusal, triggering the limitation period under Article 54 of the Limitation Act.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 54 - Suit for specific performance - Limitation period - Commencement - Suit for specific performance of contract must be filed within three years from the date fixed for performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused - Once the limitation period commences, it continues to run regardless of subsequent inability or litigation. (Paras 22, 23, 29)

(B) Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 54 - Notice of refusal - Filing of a lawsuit for possession and recovery by the owner against a party in possession constitutes constructive notice of refusal to perform the underlying agreement to sell, thereby triggering the onset of the limitation period - The initiation of such legal proceedings effectively communicates the intent not to abide by the sale agreement, notwithstanding the contestation of such legal status by the other party. (Paras 31, 33)

Facts of the case:
The plaintiff sought a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell relating to a residential property following the payment of earnest and partial consideration. The defendant, owner of the premises, later initiated a separate suit for eviction and recovery of possession and rent, asserting that the plaintiff occupied the property as a tenant. The plaintiff had previously contested the eviction suit by invoking the existence of the agreement to sell. The present suit for specific performance was filed years after the defendant initiated the eviction proceedings, leading to the question of whether the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the agreement to sell contained a fixed timeline for performance, thereby falling under the first part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The court further reasoned that even if the case were interpreted under the second part of the article, the defendant’s filing of a possession suit functioned as a formal notice of refusal to execute the sale. As the suit was filed well beyond three years of both the original fixed date and the date of notice of refusal, the claim was found to be time-barred.

Issues: The central issues were whether the suit for specific performance was time-barred under Article 54 of the Limitation Act and whether the defendant’s initiation of eviction proceedings served as sufficient notice of refusal to perform the agreement.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the limitation period for a suit for specific performance begins upon the expiry of a fixed date for performance or, in the alternative, upon receipt of notice of refusal. Legal proceedings filed by a defendant to recover possession or rent operate as clear notice of refusal to fulfill contractual obligations of sale. Once the limitation period commences, it is not extended by subsequent disputes or pending litigation.

Result: Suit dismissed as barred by limitation.

Table of Content
1. factual background involving the agreement to sell (ats), subsequent eviction litigation, and procedural history. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10)
2. parties' contentions regarding the limitation period under article 54, specifically whether a fixed date or 'refusal' triggers the clock. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17)
3. court's analysis confirming the suit is barred by limitation as per article 54, applying judicial precedents on fixed-date performance and constructive notice of refusal. (Para 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33)
4. final order dismissing the suit as time-barred. (Para 34)

JUDGEMENT

JYOTI SINGH, J.

1. This suit is instituted by the Plaintiff seeking decree of specific performance against the Defendant for performance of his part of the obligation under Receipt-cum-Agreement dated 10.08.2006 (‘ATS’) inter alia by executing and getting registered the Sale Deed and all other transfer documents in respect of property bearing No. A-14, First Floor, Neeti Bagh, New Delhi (‘suit property’) as also for a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant from transferring/alienating the suit property or creating any third party rights therein.

2. Case set out by the Plaintiff in the plaint is that Defendant represented to the Plaintiff that he was the owner of the suit property comprising of the entire first floor, garage block and half portion of terrace over first floor along with servant quarter and offered to lease the same to the Plaintiff. Consequently, an unregistered Lease Deed dated 14.09.2005 was executed between the parties for three years commencing from 14.09.2005 at a monthly rate of Rs. 30,000/- besides other charges. During subsistence of the lease, Defendant offered to sell the property to the Plaintiff as he was in possession as a tenant. Plaintiff was informed that the entire property was originally leased by Government of India to his father Late Shri Gyan Singh Vohra, who had in turn executed a registered Will dated 18.10.1993 and bequeathed the suit property to the Defendant.

3. It is stated in the plaint that believing that the Defendant was genuinely interested in selling the suit property, Plaintiff agreed to purchase the same and an ATS was executed between the parties on 10.08.2006 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 2,30,00,000/- and sum of Rs. 15 lakhs was paid by the Plaintiff as earnest money. Defendant was required to execute and register a Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff on receiving balance consideration within 8 months of the execution of the ATS. Original Lease Deed was handed over to the Plaintiff since tenancy had ceased and it was agreed that no rent shall be paid since property was purchased by the Plaintiff and earnest money had been paid. Defendant also executed a Possession Letter in favour of the Plaintiff and admittedly, after execution of ATS no rent was paid.

4. It is stated that when Plaintiff received summons of the suit filed by the Defendant before District Judge, Saket Courts for possession, recovery of rent and damages, it was realised that Defendant had concealed the factum of execution of the ATS as also payment of part sale consideration in the said suit and had misrepresented that Plaintiff was a tenant. It is also stated that under the ATS, balance sale consideration was payable by 10.04.2007 and during this period, Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and had on several occasions called upon the Defendant and his attorney Shri K.J.S. Chowdhry to execute the Sale Deed, however, each time Defendant expressed his inability to do so, owing to family disputes. The very fact that Defendant permitted the Plaintiff to continue in possession was indicative of the fact that Defendant had agreed to sell the property under the ATS. Plaintiff was, however, at a receiving end since on one hand part consideration had been paid to the Defen

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