A suit filed by a Public Charitable Trust to protect its properties from usurpers is maintainable under general civil law and does not strictly require leave under Section 92 of the CPC. Limitation involving a "continuing wrong" is a mixed question of fact and law not decidable under Order VII Rule 11.

J U D G M E N T

ANIL KSHETARPAL, J

1. The present Appeal, preferred under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, challenges the order dated 13.10.2025 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Impugned Order’] passed by the learned Single Judge in CS(OS) No. 609/2021. By the Impugned Order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the application filed by the Appellants [Defendants before the learned Single Judge] under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’] thereby declining to reject the plaint at the threshold.

2. The controversy before this Court pivots on two substantive questions of law:

i. Whether a suit instituted on behalf of a Public Trust to protect its properties and administration from alleged usurpers warrants rejection of plaint for want of leave under Section 92 of the CPC; and

ii. Whether the plea of limitation, in the face of allegations regarding continuing wrong and successive breaches, can be adjudicated summarily under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC without a trial.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The Respondent No. 1/T. Choithram Foundation, is a public charitable trust settled by Late Shri Thakurdas Choithram Pagarani vide a Trust Deed dated 24.05.1971. The dispute involves the management and control of this Trust.

4. The Respondents/Plaintiffs instituted the underlying suit in November 2021, seeking declarations that the Appellants/Defendants are not validly appointed trustees and are, in legal effect, trespassers or trustees de son tort. The Plaint alleges that the appointments of the Appellants-ranging from 1992 to 2021were made in flagrant violation of the Trust Deed and that their continued interference with the Trust’s assets constitutes a continuing wrong.

5. The Appellants moved an application for rejection of the plaint, contending that:

i. The suit seeks removal of trustees and rendition of accounts, reliefs specifically enumerated under Section 92 of the CPC. As no leave was obtained prior to institution, the suit is barred by law.

ii. The suit is barred by limitation as the Plaintiffs admittedly had knowledge of the initial appointments as far back as 1996, evident from correspondence dated 27.02.1996.

6. The learned Single Judge, in the Impugned Order, held that the suit was essentially one by the Trust to de-board persons who had allegedly usurped office, and thus did not strictly fall within the restrictive domain of Section 92 of the CPC. On limitation, the Single Judge held that the allegations of invalid appointments and mismanagement raised mixed questions of fact and law, particularly regarding the ‘continuing’ nature of the cause of action, which could not be decided without evidence.

ANALYSIS AND REASONING

7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the Impugned Order in light of the settled principles governing the rejection of plaints. The power under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is drastic; it terminates a lis without trial. Consequently, the conditions for its exercise must be strictly construed. The Court is confined to the averments in the plaint, which must be treated as true (demurrer) at this stage.

I. The Bar under Section 92 of the CPC and the Nature of the Suit

8. The Appellants vehemently argue that the suit is a "cleverly drafted" attempt to bypass Section 92 of the CPC. They contend that since