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2026 Supreme(Online)(Del) 1092
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav, J
Vipin Kumar Verma – Appellant
Versus
Secretary DLSA Shahdara – Respondent
W.P.(C) 15/2026
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Manish Kumar Singh, Anurav Gupta
For the Respondents: Cauveri Birbal, Kamlendu Pandey, Nishtha Dhall, Preksha Gaur
An administrative authority must adhere to the principles of natural justice by granting a hearing to an affected party before passing an order that results in the withdrawal or denial of previously initiated compensation.
Headnote:The case involves a challenge to an order passed by the District Legal Service Authority declining compensation to a road accident victim based on the application of the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018 (DVCS). The petitioner contended that he had received no prior compensation from the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal and was denied an opportunity to be heard before the impugned order was passed. The Court found that the impugned order was passed in violation of natural justice principles and that the exclusion clause of the scheme might be inapplicable. The core issues were whether the principle of audi alteram partem was violated and whether Clause 10.5 of the DVCS correctly applies to cases where no compensation was awarded by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal. The Court reasoned that any order prejudicially affecting a party, particularly the withdrawal of a previously sanctioned benefit, requires a prior opportunity of hearing. Furthermore, it noted that where no double compensation is involved, the restrictive clause should be re-examined. The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the respondent to reconsider the matter after providing the petitioner an opportunity to present relevant material.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. background facts and emergence of the compensation dispute. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10) |
| 2. contentions regarding applicability of compensation scheme exclusion clauses and procedural fairness. (Para 11 , 12) |
| 3. violation of natural justice necessitates reconsideration of administrative decisions. (Para 13 , 14 , 15 , 16) |
O R D E R
CM APPL. 32/2026 (EXEMPTION)
1. Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of.
W.P.(C) 15/2026
3. Heard.
4. Issue notice.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 appears and accepts notice.
6. The petition is against the order dated 05.03.2025 passed by respondent no.1 i.e. District Legal Service Authority, Shahdara (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the DLSA’).
7. The dispute stems from a road accident which had occurred on 14.02.2014, where the petitioner had suffered certain grievous injuries. An FIR was lodged and criminal case was concluded with acceptance of untraced report since the accused could not be identified. Therefore, the petitioner approached the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal (‘MACT’) seeking compensation.
8. The MACT vide judgment dated 24.02.2024 found that the involvement of the offending vehicle and the aspect of rash and negligent driving were not proved and, accordingly, declined compensation. The MACT, however, referred the matter to DLSA to consider the case for grant of compensation under extant policy.
9. It appears that vide order dated 05.04.2024, the DLSA directed for a compensation of Rs. 2 Lakhs under Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018 (DVCS). However, the said amount was not disbursed.
10. When the petitioner was pursuing the disbursal of the amount, there seems to be a communication by DLSA, applying Clause 10.5 of the DVCS, presumably, with an understanding that the cases covered under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be considered for compensation under the DVCS.
11. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner takes this Court through Clause 10.5 of the DVCS and points out that the aforesaid clause would have no application under the facts of the instant case. According to him, Clause 10.5 envisaged the avoidance of repeated (double compensation). He unequivocally submits that in the instant case, the petitioner has not been awarded any compensation by the MACT. Additionally, he also submits that before passing of the impugned order dated 05.03.2025, the petitioner was not heard.
12. Ms. Cauveri Birbal, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 and 2 who appears on advance instructions, submits that the DSLA be granted some time to place on record its reply and as per her instructions, even the said authority is willing to reconsider its decision in accordance with extant policy.
13. Having considered the submissions made by the parties, the Court finds that firstly, the order dated 05.03.2025 is passed without hearing the petitioner. The same is admittedly prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner. When there was a specific order directing for compensation, before the same was withdrawn, opportunity of hearing ought to have been extended. Under these circumstances, the impugned order deserves to be set aside on the aforesaid ground alone.
14. Additionally, there seems to be some substance in the submission of the petitioner that the concerned clause would not attract in the instant case. The same, however, will have to be considered by the respondent DLSA.
15. The petitioner shall also be at liberty to place all such orders before the DLSA, whereby, after dismissal of the MACT cases, the DLSA has awarded the compensation to the victims. If such a material is placed on record before the DLSA, there is no reason as to why the same should not be considered appropriately.
16. In view of the aforesaid, the instant petition stands disposed of with the following directions: -
(i) The impugned order dated 05.03.2025 passed by the respondent DLSA is set aside.
(ii) The DLSA is directed to recon
