2026 Supreme(Online)(Del) 1262
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Amit Mahajan, J
NARENDER SINGH – Appellant
Versus
STATE – Respondent
CRL.REV.P.-3/2014
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: R. Gopal
For the Respondents: Sunil Kumar Gautam, Ashish Aggarwal, D.P. Faizi, Aanand Aggarwal, Darshana Aggarwal, Himanshu Singh, Rahul Malik, Tanya Jain, Nistha Verma
For a charge under Section 193 IPC, absence of the original document alleged to be false evidence is fatal. Departmental findings cannot substitute criminal proof. Revisional court cannot set aside a reasoned discharge without showing perversity.
Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 192 and 193 - Fabricating false evidence and punishment for false evidence - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 195, 227, 228, 397, 401 and 482 - Scope of revisional jurisdiction - Test for framing of charge versus discharge - Necessity of primary evidence (original document) - Distinction between departmental proceedings and criminal trial - Effect of acquittal of main accused on related charge against process server.
(B) The court reiterated that at the stage of framing of charge, the judge must determine whether a prima facie case exists and whether there is grave suspicion against the accused. Mere suspicion not sufficient. The probative value of material cannot be gone into at this stage, but the court must apply judicial mind to see if ingredients of offence are made out. The court can sift and weigh evidence for limited purpose. If two views are possible, accused may be discharged. (Paras 28-31)
(C) Departmental proceedings are administrative in nature, based on preponderance of probabilities, and cannot substitute criminal prosecution which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Findings in departmental proceedings, without independent proof in accordance with law, cannot form basis of criminal charges. (Paras 40-42)
(D) In a case under Section 193 IPC, absence of the original document alleged to be false evidence renders the prosecution inherently fragile. The document must form part of the record; oral assertions or departmental findings cannot fill the gap. (Paras 38-39)
Facts of the case:
A process server was accused of fabricating a service report on summons issued by a family court in another city, allegedly by inserting a locality name in a different ink, marking the summons to himself, handing them to the complainant's husband instead of serving the complainant personally, and making a false report of service. This was alleged to have enabled an ex-parte divorce decree. An FIR was registered against the husband for cheating and rape; during investigation, the process server was given a clean chit, but the magistrate summoned him under Section 193 IPC. The magistrate later discharged him for lack of evidence (original summons not seized, no forensic opinion, complainant admitted her signatures, no nexus with husband). The Sessions Court reversed that order, directing framing of charge, relying on earlier summoning orders and departmental penalty. The High Court set aside the Sessions Court order.
Findings of Court:
The High Court held that the Sessions Court exceeded revisional jurisdiction by substituting its opinion without addressing the flaws in the prosecution case. The discharge order by the magistrate was detailed and well-reasoned. The absence of the original summons, the complainant's admission of signatures, the acquittal of the main accused (where the trial court found the complainant had voluntarily signed the summons), and the failure to challenge the ex-parte divorce decree all militated against grave suspicion. The departmental findings could not be used as substantive evidence. The continuation of trial would be an abuse of process.
Issues: 1. Whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge could interfere with the magistrate's discharge order merely on a different view, especially when the order was not perverse. 2. Whether the absence of the original document (the summons with alleged false endorsement) is fatal to a charge under Section 193 IPC. 3. Whether findings in departmental proceedings can be used as corroborative material for framing criminal charges. 4. Whether the acquittal of the main accused on the same facts (complainant's knowledge of summons) affects the case against the process server.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of framing charge/discharge, the court must examine whether prima facie material discloses grave suspicion. Where the core document (alleged false service report) is not placed on record, the offence cannot be proved; the prosecution cannot rely on oral assertions or departmental findings. The revisional court cannot set aside a discharge order without identifying perversity or illegality; it cannot substitute its opinion simply because another view is possible. The acquittal of the principal accused on the same factual matrix (complainant's voluntary signing of summons) further weakens the case against the process server.
Result: The revision petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.09.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is set aside and the order dated 18.07.2012 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate discharging the petitioner is restored. Pending applications disposed of. (Paras 1-56)
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed by the Petitioner/Accused-Sh. Narender Singh, under Section 397 , Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’) assailing the Order dated 27.09.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03 (‘ASJ’), South District, Saket Courts, whereby the learned ASJ set-aside the Order of discharge dated 18.07.2012 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (‘MM’) and directed framing of charge against the Petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’).
2. The factual matrix giving rise to the present Petition discloses a protracted litigation history. Succinctly stated, it is the case of the Respondent No.2/Complainant- Smt. Indu that she was married to one Pankaj Malhotra on 04.10.1997. Allegedly, on 31.03.2003, a lady named Pooja claimed that Pankaj had obtained an ex-parte Decree of Divorce from Jaipur Court on 04.04.2002 against Indu and Pooja has gotten married to Pankaj on 09.12.2002. It is alleged that the ex-parte divorce Decree had been obtained by Pankaj, without the consent or knowledge of Indu and she was neither served with summons nor aware of the said proceedings. Thus, on a complaint by Respondent No.2, an FIR was registered, being, FIR No. 363/2003 at Police Station Mehrauli for offences punishable under Sections 376 and 493 IPC against her husband-Pankaj alleging that despite obtaining the ex-parte Decree of divorce he continued to establish sexual relations with her.
3. The chargesheet was thereafter filed against the main accused Pankaj and the charges were framed for offences punishable under Sections 376 and 493 of the IPC on 21.03.2005.
4. During investigation, allegations surfaced that summons purportedly issued by the Jaipur Court, had been shown as served upon the Complainant at Delhi, on the basis of a Service Report dated 05.11.2001 prepared by the present Petitioner/Sh. Narender Singh, who was working as a Process Server in the Nazarat Branch of Tis Hazari Courts at the relevant time, in connivance with Pankaj.
5. It is the case of the Complainant that the Petitioner inserted the word ‘Saket’ on the original summons (in a different handwriting and ink), allegedly to enable self-marking of the process, then he marked the summons to himself as the process server and instead of effecting personal service upon the complainant, he handed over the summons to her husband/Pankaj who obtained her signatures on the summons fraudulently. The Petitioner thereafter prepared and submitted a false service report to the court recording due service upon the Complainant.
6. On the basis of the said allegation, a supplementary charge sheet was filed. Notably, the investigating agency did not find sufficient material to prosecute the Petitioner and gave him a clean chit in the supplementary report.
7. The learned MM, however, disagreed with the conclusion of the investigating agency and, vide Order dated 21.06.2007, observed that the alleged act of the Petitioner whereby he submitted a false report on the summons amounts to fabricating false evidence, as defined under section 192 of the IPC and punishable under sections 193 of the IPC and thus, summoned the Petitioner to face trial for the offence under Section 193 of the IPC.
8. This summoning order was challenged by the Petitioner before the Sessions Court and thereafter before this Court, but both the challenges were dismissed vide Orders dated 11.04.2008 and 03.07.2008, respectively.
9. The learned MM, considered the entire material on record and, after hearing the parties, passed a detailed Order dated 18.07.2012 discharging the Petitioner, on the grounds that: -
a) The original summons, forming the very basis of the accusation of preparation of a false service report, were neither seized from Jaipur Court nor produced during investigation;
b) The reliance on findings recorded in departmental proceedings, wherein the Petitioner was he
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