1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records available before us on this letters patent appeal.

2. This intra-court appeal seeks an exception to the judgment and order dated 27.08.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby W.P.(C) 3422/2014, which was preferred by the respondent challenging the award dated 04.10.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), was allowed and the award of the Tribunal was set aside.

3. Learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order has, however, directed that the amount paid to the appellant under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) shall not be recovered.

4. At this juncture, we may note that while passing the award dated 04.10.2012, which was under challenge before the learned Single Judge in the proceedings of the writ petition, the learned Tribunal has found that termination of the services of the appellant w.e.f. 09.08.2007 was unjustified and illegal, and that she was entitled to be reinstated with full backwages and continuity in service, along with all consequential benefits.

5. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single Judge has wrongly held that merely because the appellant was a probationer, she was not a ‘workman’ within the meaning of the said term occurring in Section 2(s) of the Act. In this regard, it has been vehemently submitted that so far as the applicability of the provisions of the Act is concerned, the provisions therein do not carve out any distinction between the probationer and a confirmed employee.

6. Drawing our attention to Section 2(s) of the Act, it has been argued that ‘workman’ has been defined in the said provision to mean any person (including a apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment are express or implied. It is the case, thus, set up by the appellant that since Section 2(s) of the Act does not differentiate between a probationer and a confirmed employee, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order holding that since the appellant was a probationer, she was not a ‘workman’, is erroneous.

7. Further submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned Single Judge has set aside the award dated 04.10.2012 made by the Tribunal wrongly holding that the order terminating her services was an order of termination simpliciter and since services of a probationer can be terminated without assigning any reason as such, the order terminating the services of the appellant did not suffer from any illegality. In this respect, it has been argued that the order dated 09.08.2007 terminating the services mentions that some misbehaviour with and insubordination of superiors was observed on the part of the appellant, and therefore, the foundation of the order of termination is the alleged misconduct, misbehaviour and insubordination hence the said order cannot be said to be an order of termination simpliciter; rather it is an order with cast stigma to the conduct of the appellant. His submission is that since the order terminating the services of the appellant was stigmatic, it cannot be termed to be an order of termination simpliciter, and therefore, without holding any inquiry and affording opportunity of hearing and stating her case, the services of the petitioner could not have been terminated.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant has, thus, urged that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in this regard are not sustainable for the reason that if applying the doctrine of lifting the veil, the order terminating the services of the appellant dated 09.08.2007 is examined, it is clearly found that the same was not an order of termination simpliciter, rath