$~4 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 28.01.2026 + ARB.P. 397/2025 RAMAN KUMAR .....Petitioner Through: Mr. A. Mishra, Mr. Sahil and Mr. Nidish, Advocates.

versus MS SKYTEX UNMANNED AREIAL SOLUTION PRIVATE LIMITED .....Respondent Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Mr. A.K.

Seth and Ms. Palak Mathur, Advocates. CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR % J U D G E M E N T (Oral)

1. The present Petition, under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Act, has been filed seeking the appointment of an Arbitrator for the adjudication of disputes inter se the parties arising out of the Memorandum of Understanding dated

20.12.2022, MoU

2. The MoU contains the Arbitration Clause at Clauses 11 and 12, which read as under: “11. Dispute Resolution Any disputes or differences involving this MOU whenever arising shall be resolved mutua ly by the both parties within 30 days of receipt of the written notice that regard from the aggrieved party. Failing amicable settlement, the matter shall be resolved through an arbitration tribunal comprising of sole arbitrator appointed by mutual consent by the parties hereto and in the event of the parties fail to mutually appoint an arbitrator, he shall be appointed by Court of competent jurisdiction. The award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties.

12. Law/Jurisdiction The engagement shall be subject to Indian laws. The Parties to this MOU submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in New Delhi for settling any dispute arising out of the engagement hereunder”

3. Material on record indicates that since disputes had arisen between the parties, the Petitioner herein invoked the Arbitration Clause in terms of the provisions of Section 21 of the Act vide Legal Notice dated 02.12.2024.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the appointment of an Arbitrator on the ground that the original copy of the said MoU has not been produced. However, learned counsel for the Petitioner has handed over across the Bar the original MoU, and accordingly, this objection is rendered infructuous and therefore does not survive.

5. Learned counsel for the Respondent further raises an objection that the parties never actually entered into an Agreement. This Court is of the opinion that all such objections can be raised and are well within the jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator.

6. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. M/s Krish Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 has extensively dealt with the scope of interference at the stage of Section 11of the Act. The relevant extract of Krish Spinning (supra) reads as under:-

“113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the requirement that the agreement should be in writing.

114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16 implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry, which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16. The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.

115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the arbitration agree