$~20 * IN THEHIGH COURTOF DELHIAT NEW DELHI + FAO 255/2017 KASHMIRI LAL & SONS .....Appellant Through: Mr. Kunal Kalra, Advocate versus SHIV SHANKAR SINGHAL & ANR .....Respondents Through: None CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

O R D E R

% 21.01.2026

1. By way of present appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the appellant seeks setting aside of the judgment dated 04.02.2017 passed by Ld. ADJ-08, Central, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi whereby objections filed by the respondents under Section 34 to the Award were dismissed being barred by limitation. However, vide the said order the Ld. ADJ also proceeded further to hold that the proceedings before the Delhi Grain Merchants Association were not arbitral proceedings within the meaning of the Act and consequently set aside the arbitral award dated 29.10.2010 as well as the revised award dated 17.05.2012, and further held that the execution proceedings were not maintainable.

2. It is noted that respondents have not been appearing for several dates and, vide order dated 19.11.2025 they were proceeded against ex-parte.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that, having reached the conclusion that objections filed under Section 34 of the Act are barred by limitation, the Court could not have rendered proceeded to examine or render findings on the merits of the arbitral Award.

4. Concededly, the respondents, who had preferred objections under Section 34 of the Act, has not assailed the impugned order.

5. The impugned order insofar as dismissal of Section 34 petition being time barred is concerned, it is a well settled position of law that under Section 34(3) of the Act, an application for setting aside an arbitral award is required to be filed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the award. The Court may, on sufficient cause being shown, extend the said period by a further period not exceeding thirty days, but not thereafter. The use of the words „but not thereafter‟ in the Act, shows that subject to petitioner showing sufficient cause, the outer limit for challenging the Award is thirty days after the initial period of three months. Once the objections under Section 34 are filed beyond the said date, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the same being time barred and also has no power to condone the delay. Any interpretation to the contrary would render the phrase „but not thereafter‟ wholly otiose. It is also fairly well settled that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply to the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act, and the time period stipulated in Section 34 is not extendable beyond the time limit prescribed in the proviso to Sub Section 3 of Section 34.

6. Coming to the other part of the impugned order whereby award was also set aside, in the considered opinion of this Court, once a finding that the objections under Section 34 of the Act were barred by limitation, was rendered, the further observations of the Court declaring that the Award was void ab initio or not executable, is manifestly perverse. The court below, by commenting on the merits of award in a time barred challenge exceeded its jurisdiction. Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain objections under Section 34 beyond the stipulated limitation period, which is held to be not condonable in various judicial precedents.

7. Consequently, the setting aside of the execution proceedings by the court below is legally perverse too.

8. In view of the above discussions, the appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent and execution petition is restored.

MANOJ KUMAR OHRI, J JANUARY 21, 2026/ga