In revision against acquittal, concurrent findings of fact based on plausible appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with unless perversity or jurisdictional error is shown. The statutory definition of cruelty under Section 498A IPC requires specific, verifiable facts meeting the statutory threshold.

ORDER

% 18.12.2025

1. This petition is directed against the judgment dated 19th May, 2022, passed by the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge (SFTC), Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in Criminal Appeal No. 108/2020 titled “Shelly v. Deepak & Ors.” By the impugned judgment, the appellate court dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the judgment dated 11th December, 2019, passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court) in FIR No. 37/2012, acquitting the accused of the offences under Sections 498A /406/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, (1 “IPC”).

2. FIR No. 37/2012 was registered on 17th February, 2012 under Sections 498A /406/34 IPC. The charge-sheet, upon investigation, alleged dowry-linked cruelty and misappropriation of the complainant’s stridhan.

3. By order dated 4th November, 2016, the Trial Court discharged accused Deepa, Mamta and Dheeraj. Charges were framed for the offence under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC against Deepak, Raj Rani andArun, and for the offence under Section 406 read with Section 34 IPC against Deepak and Raj Rani. They pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined five witnesses in support of its case. During the pendency of the trial, accused Raj Rani expired, whereupon proceedings against her stood abated by order dated 2nd May, 2018.

4. After the prosecution closed its evidence, statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 “CrPC”) and all incriminating circumstances were put to them. They denied the allegations. No defence evidence was led. Proceedings continued against Deepak and Arun, and the Trial Court ultimately acquitted them. The appellate court, by the impugned judgment, affirmed the acquittal.

5. Counsel for the Petitioner assails the concurrent judgments on the following grounds:

5.1. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have approached the evidence with an unduly rigid lens and have not engaged with the settled principles that govern appreciation of evidence in prosecutions under Sections 498A and 406 IPC.

5.2. The Trial Court fell into error in concluding that there was no “specific dowry demand”, even though the complainant had specifically stated that the husband persistently pressurised her to get her mother’s house transferred in his name. According to the Petitioner, such insistence on transfer of parental property is, in substance, an unlawful demand of valuable security and falls squarely within dowry-related harassment. The Trial Court itself recorded this assertion in paragraph 17 of the judgment, yetfailed to attach due legal significance to it.

5.3. This very ground was raised before the Appellate court, yet the appellate reasoning does not address it. The omission, vitiates the appellate scrutiny, particularly because the ground goes to the core of the finding on Section 498A .

5.4. Both courts have erred in treating the allegations of cruelty as “bald” merely because the complainant and her mother did not furnish dates, months, or specific instances. Domestic cruelty often manifests as a continuing course of conduct. The complainant and her mother in their testimonies repeatedly used the expression “used to”, which conveys habitual and recurring acts. According to the Petitioner, it is unrealistic to expect a victim or her parent to recall each incident with calendar precision,