* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Judgement delivered on: 28.01.2026 + ARB.P. 1479/2025 WINFRA BUILD TECH PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Atul Verma, Advocate.

versus NKG INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED .....Respondent Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Mr. Mehul Jain, Ms. Payal Singh, Ms. Riya, Mr. Nikhil Malik, Ms. Shipra Bhardwaj, Mr. Vivek Chandrasekhar, Mr. Yash Tiwari, Ms. Manaswee Gupta, Mr. Ravi and Ms. Sowmya China, Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR JUDGEMENT (ORAL

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, $~7, seeking the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes alleged to have arisen between the parties out of the Work Order/Purchase Order dated

08.02.2024.

2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner places reliance upon Clause 29 of the Purchase Order dated 08.02.2024, Purchase Order, which has been

1 Act

annexed as ‘Document No. D1’ to the present petition. The said clause reads as under: -

“29. Dispute Resolution:

1. All dispute and claims will be mutually discussed and agreed upon at site level. in case of any difference of opinion, the decision of “Contracts Head” of NKG Infrastructure shall be final and binding.

2. Arbitrators, if needed shall be appointed by NKG Infrastructure Ltd in Delhi only.

3. Any further dispute shall be settled in courts of jurisdiction of Delhi.”

3. It is the case of the Petitioner that disputes subsequently arose between the parties, pursuant to which arbitration was invoked by way of a legal notice dated 22.07.2025. It is contended that despite the invocation of arbitration, no Arbitrator was appointed by the Respondent, compelling the Petitioner to approach this Court by filing the present petition.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent, however, submits that there exists no valid or enforceable arbitration agreement between the parties. It is urged that Clause 29 of the Purchase Order, as relied upon by the Petitioner, is vague, ambiguous, and does not unequivocally provide for arbitration as the agreed and definitive mechanism for the resolution of disputes between the parties.

5. Learned counsel for the Respondent further submits that the clause merely reflects a tentative or optional possibility of arbitration, evident from the use of the expression “Arbitrators, if needed”. It is argued that such language demonstrates the absence of a firm and binding consensus ad idem between the parties to mandatorily refer disputes to arbitration. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, stating that an arbitration agreement must reflect a clear, unambiguous, and definitive intention of the parties to submit disputes to arbitration, without requiring any further consent at a later stage. In the absence of such clarity, the disputes cannot be referred to arbitration.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that Clause 29 constitutes an arbitration clause and that the appointment of the Arbitrator ought to be made in terms thereof.

7. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length, and with their able assistance, this Court has carefully perused the paper book and other materials placed on record.

8. There is a consistent and settled line of precedent laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court to the effect that the intention of the parties to enter into an arbitration agreement must be gathered from the terms of the agreement as a whole. Where the terms clearly indicate an intention to refer disputes to a tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to be bound by its decision, such clause would constitute an arbitration agreement.

9. It is equally well settled that where there is a clear and specific expression of intent to resolve disputes through arbitration, it is not necessary for the clause to expressly incorporate all the attributes of an arbitration agreement. However, where the dispute resolution clause contains language th