* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of Decision: 22.01.2026 + W.P.(C) 3824/2022 THE REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Braja Bandhu Pradhan, Advocate.

versus M/S. APRA AUTO (INDIA) PVT. LTD. .....Respondent Through: None.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI JUDGMENT (ORAL)

1. The present petition has been filed seeking setting aside of the order dated 08.04.2021 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labor Court-II, Rouse Avenue, Delhi (hereinafter “the Tribunal”) whereby, while appreciating the appeal, the order passed under Section 14B of The Employees’ Provident Funds And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter “the EPF and MP Act”) was set aside.

2. Notably, despite being served, the respondent did not appear in the underlying proceedings before RPFC Gurgaon and was proceeded ex parte on 05.05.2015. Even in the present proceedings, efforts to serve the respondent remained futile and substituted service was directed. The necessary publications were carried out, and an affidavit of service was also filed.

3. The petitioner has claimed that initially, the concerned officer had passed an order on 27.03.2018 under Sections 14B and 7Q of the EPF & MP Act whereby it had assessed the payable dues and directed the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.16,38,313/- towards damages under Section 14B as well as Rs.8,00,7899/- towards interest under Section 7Q, for delayed remittance of EPF dues of its employees for the period between March 2014 and June 2015. The respondent challenged the said order by way of an appeal filed on 04.02.2020, and the said proceedings resulted in the issuance of the impugned order.

4. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order on the ground that the appeal filed by the respondent was barred by time and the Tribunal had no power to condone the delay, as well as on the ground that the impugned order erred in recording that the appellant could not establish mens rea on the part of the respondent.

5. Insofar as the first contention is concerned, it is pertinent to note that Rule 7 of the Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (“the CGIT Rules”) prescribe a time limit of 60 days for assailing any order by way of an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has also been empowered, on being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring an appeal within the prescribed period, to extend the said period by a further period of 60 days. In this regard, Rule 7 of the CGIT Rules reads as under:-

“7. Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.—

(1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee of Rupees five hundred to be remitted in the form of Crossed Demand Draft on a nationalized bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the station where the seat of the said Tribunal situate.

(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.

Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75% of the amount due from him as determined under Section 7-A.

Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section 7-O.”

6. It is trite law that when a special statute provides a specific limitation period and limited power to condone delay beyond the said period, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply. A ga