* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 11.02.2026 + O.M.P. (COMM) 375/2024, I.A. 38279/2024 (Stay) & I.A.

38285/2024 (Delay of 59 days in Re-filing the petition)

UNION OF INDIA .....Petitioner Through: Ms. Nidhi Raman CGSC with Mr. Zubin Singh, Mr. Arnav Mittal & Mr. Akash Mishra Advs. with Ms. Archana Chhibber, legal consultant MEA versus M/S VISHWA-BVSR JV .....Respondent Through: Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Kartik Yadav, Mr. Sidhant Kaushik, Mr. Sankalp Singh .&

Ms. Mokshha Sharma, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR % JUDGEMENT (ORAL)

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

I.A. 38278/2024 (Delay of 28 days in filing the petition)

1. This objection Petition being O.M.P. (COMM) 375/2024, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, $~22, has been filed impugning the Amended Arbitral Award dated 30.12.2023 passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal in the case titled “M/S Vishwa-

1 Act

BVSR JV v. Union Of India”.

2. The present Petition is also accompanied by an Application being I.A. 38278/2024 seeking condonation of delay in filing in filing the said Petition.

3. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent would raise a preliminary objection to the present Petition, stating that the same is barred by limitation since it exceeds a statutory period of three months and 30 days as provided for in the Act, more specifically Section

34(3).

4. In the present matter, the log information has been filed by the Registry, which indicates that the Petition came to be filed on

30.04.2024 at 10:52 PM.

5. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further submits that as per the Delhi High Court (Original-Side Rules), 2018, read with the Practice Directions for Electronic Filing, any filing done after 4:00 p.m. is considered to be filed on the next working day

6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent submits that on the basis of an Application under Section 33 of the Act, the arbitration proceedings came to be disposed of vide Order dated 30.12.2023, and it is from this date that the limitation will have to commence.

7. He submits that on the basis of the said date on which limitation commences, the filing of the present Petition on the 30.04.2024 would be beyond the period of limitation as provided for under the Act as the period of three months and 30 days expired on 29.04.2024.

8. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to advert to the relevant Section, being Section 34(3) of the Act, which reads as follows:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.

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(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.

….”

9. Brevitatis causa, the relevant dates for the purpose of calculating the delay are tabulated herein below:

10. A perusal of the above tabular statement shows that the present Petition has been filed 2 days beyond the 30-day condonable period as provided for under Section 34 of the Act. This Court further takes note that the Application seeking condonation of delay fails to provide any sufficient cause justifying the said delay. In fact, the application seeking the condonation of delay shows that the Petitioner herein has miscalculated the statutory period within which a Section 34 Petition is to be preferred and states that the present Petiti