1. Petition under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking appointment of a substituted arbitrator. (Para 1 )
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2026 Supreme(Online)(Del) 4990
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, J
Food Inn Now Known As Hotel Signature Inn – Appellant
Versus
Alcott Town Planners Private Limited Now Known As Oyo Hotels And Homes Private Limited – Respondent
O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 27/2025 | I.A. 8783/2025
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Shakul R. Ghatole
For the Respondents: Harsh Kaushik, Adrija Mishra
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Shakul R. Ghatole
For the Respondents: Harsh Kaushik, Adrija Mishra
A petition for the substitution of an arbitrator is not maintainable if the Arbitral Tribunal's mandate has terminated due to a failure to seek or grant an extension under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Headnote:(A) Arbitration Law - Substitution of Arbitrator - Mandate of Tribunal - Where the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal is not extended within the period prescribed under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the mandate stands terminated and a petition for substitution of an arbitrator under Section 15 is not maintainable. (Para 2, 4, 9)
Issues: Whether a petition for the substitution of an arbitrator is maintainable when the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal has expired without extension under Section 29A.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- practice and procedure
- statutory interpretation
Table of Contents
2. Respondent argued mandate terminated under Section 29A, relying on Raj Chawla; Petitioner argued no termination under Section 32. (Para 2 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 )
3. The coordinate bench judgment in Raj Chawla squarely applies to the facts and operates in full force. (Para 9 )
4. Without extension of mandate under Section 29A, the arbitral tribunal's mandate terminates and a substitution petition is not maintainable. (Para 2 , 3 , 4 )
5. Petition dismissed as there is no subsisting mandate for a substitute arbitrator to be appointed. (Para 10 , 11 )
6. Can a substitute arbitrator be appointed when the mandate of the arbitral tribunal has terminated under Section 29A?
No, a petition under Section 15 for substitution is not maintainable as there are no subsisting proceedings. (Para 2 , 4 )
7. What is the effect of not seeking extension of the arbitral mandate under Section 29A(4)?
The mandate terminates and proceedings should be terminated in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Act. (Para 2 )
8. Does delay in filing the statement of claim alone terminate the arbitral mandate?
No, mere delay does not ipso facto result in termination of the mandate. (Para 5 )
9. Is a petition under Section 15 maintainable if no arbitral proceedings are in existence?
No, in the absence of subsisting proceedings, a petition for substitution is not maintainable. (Para 3 , 4 )
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, $~10 seeking the appointment of a substituted Arbitrator.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents would strongly object to the same, placing reliance upon the judgment of the learned Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Raj Chawla and Co. Stock and Share Brokers v. Nine Media and Information Services Ltd. and
Another, 2023 SCC Online Del 520 and in particular Paragraphs 14 and 16 thereof, which reads as follows:
“14. The recordal of facts above would indubitably establish that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was never extended within the period prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 29 A. The parties have also not petitioned the court for extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal even thereafter and in accordance with Section 29 A(4). Viewed in light of the above, it is manifest that the question of a substitute arbitrator being appointed really does not arise. This since not only had the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal come to an end, in the fitness of things, the proceedings should have been terminated in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Act.
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16. It must at the outset be noted that Section 29A originally came to be inserted in the statue in 2016 itself and thus evidently prior to the order of reference made by the Court. In any case, regard must be had to the fact that, even when the said provision was originally introduced by Act 3 of 2016, it was ordained to operate retrospectively with effect from 23 October 2015. Undisputedly, the reference to the Arbitral Tribunal in the present case came to be made thereafter. Consequently, and when viewed from either angle, the Court finds itself unable to countenance the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal subsisting today. The Court also bears in mind that Section 25(3) in any case existed on the statute book since inception.”
3. He also submits that, against Raj Chawla (supra) a Special Leave Petition came to be preferred, which was rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He further places reliance upon paragraph 14 of the aforestated judgment and contends that in the absence of any extension having been sought or granted in terms of Section 29A of the Act, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal stood terminated and the proceedings ought to have been brought to an end in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
4. In view of Paragraph 16 of Raj Chawla (supra), it is urged that there is, as on date, no subsisting Arbitral Tribunal and, consequently,
substitution of an Arbitrator would not be maintainable.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner would rely upon the judgment passed by learned Single Judge of this Court titled EMCO Limited v. Delhi Transco Limited to contend that mere delay in filing the statement of claim does not ipso facto result in termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal and that the Court ought to adopt a pro-arbitration approach.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further seeks to controvert the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the Respondents by submitting that, in terms of Section 23(1) of the Act, there ought to have been a determination by the learned Arbitrator of the timeline for filing of the statement of claim. He submits that no such direction fixing the time period for filing of the statement of claim was passed by the learned Arbitrator, which, according to him, is the reason the statement of claim was not filed for over a period of two years.
7. He further submits that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal has not terminated, as the present situation does not fall within the ambit of Section 32 of the Act. In the absence of any such termination in terms of the said provision,
