$~8 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of Decision: 11.03.2026 + ARB.P. 2096/2024 ST JOANS EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Rohan Sharma and Ms.

Ruchika Sharma, Advocates.

versus MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LIMITED (MTNL)

.....Respondent Through: Mr. Prashant Sharma and Mr.

Bhavya Belwal, Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR % JUDGEMENT (ORAL)

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 11(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Act, seeking the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties arising out of the Lease Deed Agreement dated 11.05.2017, Agreement

2. The material on record indicates that the arbitration clause is envisaged in the Agreement, being Clause 11, which reads as under:-

“11.0 ARBITRATION

11.1 In the event of any question, dispute or differences arising under this agreement or in connection therewith (except as to matters the decision of which is specifically provided under this agreement), the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration by the ED, MTNL Delhi Unit (hereinafter referred to as the said officer)

or any person nominated by him.

…..”

3. The material on record further indicates that the Section 21 Notice is dated 18.01.2024.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent raises an objection that the Section 21 Notice ought to have been addressed to the Executive Director, ED and could not have been addressed in a generic manner to Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, MTNL. In support of the said submission, reliance is placed upon the Order dated

24.01.2014 passed in the ARB. P. 31/2014 filed before this Court.

5. This Court notes that the said Order is prior to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., (2020) 20 SCC 760 by virtue of which it has been held that unilateral appointment of an Arbitrator is against the law.

6. A perusal of the aforesaid Clause reveals that the said arbitration Clause would only operate in the event that the ED himself was to act as the Arbitrator; therefore, the said Clause cannot be interpreted to mean that only the ED is empowered to nominate an Arbitrator. Therefore, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the Respondent is rejected.

7. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the legal position governing the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act is no longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, (2024) 12 SCC 1, after taking into consideration the authoritative pronouncement of the seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial intervention at the stage of Section 11of the Act. The excerpt of Krish Spg (supra) reads as under:-

“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act

110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the arbitrators.

111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A) in 2015. Thus, although both thes