$~36 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment Delivered on: 11.03.2026 + O.M.P. (COMM) 407/2025 DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Gaganmeet Singh Sachdeva, Mr.

Harshpreet Singh Chadha and Mr.

Hridyesh Khanna, Advs.

versus KUNAL FOOD PRODUCTS PVT LTD .....Respondent Through: Mr. AjayKumar, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

JUDGMENT

VIKAS MAHAJAN, J (OPEN COURT)

I.A. 25007/2025 (under Section 151 CPC r/w Section 5 of Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present petition)

1. The present application has been filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay in filing the present petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, ‘the Act’). The present petition has been filed challenging the arbitral award dated 31.05.2024.

2. It is stated in the application that the award dated 31.05.2024 was received by the petitioner physically on 24.06.2024, however, objection petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed by the petitioner before the learned District Judge, Commercial Court-04, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts Delhi being OMP (COMM) 9/2024 on 27.09.2024, which was later withdrawn on 19.05.2025 with liberty to seek appropriate remedy as per law.

3. Mr. Gaganmeet Singh Sachdeva, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that thereafter, the present petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed on 29.08.2025 before this Court, since this Court has the pecuniaryjurisdiction.

4. Notice was issued by this Court vide order dated 09.10.2025, only confined to the present application seeking condonation of delay.

5. A perusal of the facts delineated in the application indicates that the physical delivery of the award to the petitioner was completed on 24.06.2024; however, a petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed before the learned District Judge, Commercial Court, only on 27.09.2024. This indicates that the petition was filed beyond the statutorily prescribed limit of three months. The said petition was subsequentlywithdrawn on 19.05.2025. 6. Further, the petitioner filed a Section 34 petition before this Court on 29.08.2025, which shows that again more than three months were taken to file the said petition.

7. In view of the foregoing factual background, even if the benefit of the Section 14¹ of the Limitation Act, 1963 is given to the petitioner and the 1 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—(1) In computing the periodoflimitationforanysuitthetimeduringwhichtheplaintiffhasbeenprosecutingwithduediligence anothercivilproceeding,whetherinacourtoffirstinstanceorofappealorrevision,againstthedefendant shallbeexcluded,wheretheproceedingrelatestothesamematterinissueandisprosecutedingoodfaith

inacourtwhich,fromdefectofjurisdictionorothercauseofalikenature,isunabletoentertainit.

(2)Incomputingtheperiodoflimitationforanyapplication,thetimeduringwhichtheapplicanthasbeen prosecutingwithduediligenceanothercivilproceeding,whetherinacourtoffirstinstanceorofappealor revision,againstthesamepartyforthesamereliefshallbeexcluded,wheresuchproceedingisprosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertainit.

period for which it was bonafidely pursuing its remedy before the learned District Judge, Commercial Court, is excluded, still the petition has been filed beyond the prescribed period of three months plus 30 days.

8. Therefore, the solitary issue that requires consideration is whether the filing of the petition under Section 34 of the Act is beyond the statutory limitation period provided under Section 34(3) of the Act. For the sake of readyreference, the relevant sections are reproduced hereunder:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).

(2) An arbitral award ma