ORDER

09.04.2025

1. Mr. Zoheb Hossain, learned counsel for the ED has placed on record a compilation which includes a copy of the order dated 04.04.2025 passed by the Supreme Court in the case of S. Martin Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (SLP (Crl) No. 4768/2024. He says that the order in the case of Mahavir Prasad Rungta Vs. Directorate of Enforcement SLP (Crl) 12353/2024 has not been uploaded as yet.

2. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has reiterated his arguments that the proceedings in the money laundering offence must not proceed to the next stage until and unless that next stage has been completed in the scheduled offence. He submits that in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1, the Supreme Court has held that the proceedings under the PMLA cannot subsist in the absence of a scheduled offence, as without the existence of the scheduled offence and the resultant generation of proceeds of crime, there can be no offence of money laundering. The same has also been followed by the Delhi High Court in Prakash Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2023 SCC Online Del 336. It is submitted that in the prosecution for the predicate offence, the case has not reached at the stage of consideration of charge. If he is discharged for the predicate offence, the

money laundering offence under PMLA cannot proceed. He submits that if the trial court proceeds further in the PMLA case to frame charge, and later on the petitioner is discharged for the predicate offence, such a paradoxical result would be contrary to the statutory frame work of the PMLA as well as law laid down in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary’s case (supra)

3. Mr. Zoheb Hossain, learned special counsel for the ED places strong reliance on the order dated 04.04.2025 passed by the Supreme Court in the case of S. Martin (supra) wherein the Supreme Court issued interim directions that the trial of the scheduled offence as also under the PMLA shall go on, subject to the rider that no judgment should be pronounced. It has been submitted that trial in both the cases is independent of each other, and therefore, there is no embargo in the trial court proceeding further to consider the question of framing of charge.

4. Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the petitioner however submits that interim orders passed in the case of Martin (supra) would not be applicable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as in Martin’s case, the question for consideration is entirely different. In the said case, the application was filed by the accused for keeping further proceedings in abeyance till the disposal of the case relating to the predicate offence whereas in the present case, the question for consideration before this Court is the stay of proceedings relating to the framing of charge till such time such question is decided in the predicate offence. He further submits that even otherwise the interim orders hold no precedential value, he places reliance on the case of Kapila Hingorani (1) vs. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1 wherein it has been held that:

“A precedent is a judicial decision containing a principle, which

forms an authoritative element termed as ratio decidendi. An interim order which does not finally and conclusively decide an issue cannot be a precedent. Any reasons assigned in support of such non-final interim order containing prima facie findings, are only tentative. Any interim directions issued on the basis of such prima facie findings are temporary arrangements to preserve the status quo till the matter is finally decided, to ensure that the matter does not become either in-fructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing.”

5. The question for determination in this petition is as to whether the framing of charge under PMLA should be deferred or stayed until the charges are finalized for the predicate (scheduled offence).

6. Under Section 3 of the PMLA, the offence of money laundering arises from proceeds of c