$~21 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Date of decision: 17.04.2026 + MAT.APP.(F.C.) 312/2024 & CM APPL. 56056/2024 DOLLY RAGHAV .....Appellant Through: Ms. Samridhi Dohbal, Adv.

versus UDAY SINGH .....Respondent Through: Appearance not given.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

JUDGMENT

1. The present appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the order dated 03.09.2024 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, South West District, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in HMA No. 3668/2023 titled Uday Singh v. Dolly Raghav, whereby the learned Family Court declined to take on record the written statement filed by the appellant and, consequently, struck off her defence on the ground that the same had been filed beyond the prescribed period.

2. The relevant facts, in brief, are that the marriage between the parties was solemnised according to Hindu rites and customs on 25.02.2006 and disputes thereafter arose between them, resulting in them living separately. The respondent/husband instituted a petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter ‘HMA’) before the learned Family Court.

3. In those proceedings, as per the report of the process server, summons was served upon the appellant/wife on 29.03.2024. Thereafter, on 04.05.2024, the learned Family Court directed filing of the written statement within a period of four weeks. The appellant ultimately filed her written statement on 02.09.2024.

4. However, by the impugned order dated 03.09.2024, the learned Family Court declined to take the written statement on record and struck off the appellant’s defence on the ground that the same had been filed beyond the permissible period reckoned from the date of service of summons. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.

5. Ms. Samridhi Dohbal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the appellant had appeared with her counsel only on 04.05.2024, on which date the learned Family Court directed her to file the written statement within a period of four weeks. It is further submitted that the appellant, being a layperson and unfamiliar with legal procedure, was under the bona fide impression that the written statement was required to be filed pursuant to such direction and was not aware that the same ought to have been filed earlier on the first date of appearance.

6. It is submitted that the written statement came to be filed on 02.09.2024, which, according to the appellant, fell within the period of 120 days counted from 04.05.2024, which is the day, the learned Family Court directed filing of the written statement within a period of four weeks. It is submitted that the appellant, being a layperson and unfamiliar with legal procedure, had no knowledge of the requirement of filing of written statement, and therefore, the period of limitation ought to be computed from the date of such direction rather than from the date of service of summons.

7. It is submitted that the closure of appellant’s right to file the written statement would result in irreparable prejudice, inasmuch as the appellant would be effectively deprived of placing her defence on record in a matrimonial dispute and any adjudication in the absence of such defence would seriously affect her rights. In these circumstances, learned counsel for the appellant prays that the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

8. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that the learned Family Court has rightly declined to take the written statement on record and proceeded to strike off the appellant’s defence as the written statement was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed period of 120 days from the date of service of summons. It is submitted that the appellant was duly served and had sufficient opportunity to file her written statement within time but failed to do so without any cogent explanation.

9. We hav