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2026 Supreme(Online)(Del) 6540

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Sanjeev Narula, J
C. Ramesh – Appellant
Versus
Director, Vallabhbai Patel Chest Institute – Respondent
W.P.(C) 10595/2018



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Padma Kumar S., Gurpreet Singh
For the Respondents: M. K. Singh, Santosh Kumar, Devansh Malhotra, Syed Abdul Haseeb, Syed Abdur Rahman, Muhammad Aamir Khan

Disciplinary proceedings initiated by an authority lacking statutory competence are void ab initio and cannot be rendered valid through retrospective ratification or ex post facto resolution by a superior authority, as jurisdiction must exist at the foundational stage of the legal process.

Headnote:(A) Administrative Law - Disciplinary Proceedings - Competence of Authority - Delegation of Powers - When service rules mandate that a specific authority is empowered to initiate disciplinary action, the exercise of such power by another body without explicit delegation is void ab initio. Foundational acts, such as the issuance of charge memoranda, cannot be validated ex post facto by subsequent resolutions of a superior authority to cure jurisdictional defects existing at the time of initiation. (Paras 22, 24, 28)

(B) Service Law - Termination - Curative Proceedings - Principles of Administrative Competence - An action characterized as non est in law for want of jurisdiction cannot be transformed into a valid legal proceeding through retroactive ratification. Disciplinary actions must strictly adhere to the governing legal framework existing at the time of the initial action. (Paras 23, 26)

Facts of the case:
An employee challenged a termination order which attempted to retrospectively validate a previous dismissal action that had been set aside by a court due to a lack of competence by the initiating body. The employer relied on a resolution from a superior council to claim that the disciplinary authority had been retrospectively confirmed as valid.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the governing rules did not empower the body that initiated the proceedings. The subsequent resolution aimed at removing doubts merely attempted to cure the foundational lack of jurisdiction, which is impermissible. The initial action remained inherently flawed and could not be sustained by post-facto endorsement.

Issues: Whether retrospective approval by a superior body can rectify a lack of initial jurisdiction in disciplinary proceedings and whether an action classified as void at its inception can be validated through subsequent ratification.

Ratio Decidendi: Disciplinary authority must be vested in the body acting at the time of inception of proceedings. Acts carried out without statutory competence are void from the outset and cannot be retroactively legalized, as the integrity of disciplinary procedure requires the adherence to authority at the foundational stage.

Result: Petition allowed; termination order set aside; reinstatement ordered; liberty granted to the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings if permitted by law.

Table of Content
1. procedural history and factual background regarding the contested termination of a vpci employee. (Para 1)

JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J.:

1. This writ petition assails order dated 2nd May, 2017, whereby the services of the Petitioner with Vallabhbhai Patel Chest Institute1“VPCI” have once again been terminated. The impugned order does not arise in isolation; it is the culmination of a long and chequered procedural history. The challenge in the present round rests on a narrow yet substantial ground: the Petitioner contends that the defect which had earlier persuaded this Court to set aside the initial dismissal was never cured, and that the Respondents have sought to rectify the same ex post facto by invoking the Executive Council of the University of Delhi. The Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the requisite authority always vested in the Governing Body and, in any event, stood affirmed by the Executive Council, thereby sustaining the impugned action.

Factual Background

2.1. The Petitioner joined VPCI as Assistant Registrar (Group A) in terms of offer of appointment dated 09th June, 2001. In terms of this appointment, his service conditions were governed by the University Non-Teaching Employees (Terms & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1971,2“1971 Rules” as amended from time to time, and other rules applicable to the Institute.

2.2. The Governing Body of VPCI, in their meeting on 21st January, 2011, took a decision to initiate major penalty proceedings against the Petitioner, leading to the issuance of charge memorandum dated 28th March, 2011 comprising nine articles of charge. They related, broadly, to delays and irregularities in the accounts branch, non-implementation of administrative directions, use of objectionable language in correspondence, direct representation to the Vice-Chancellor, and remarks made in response to adverse entries.

2.3. The Petitioner submitted his defence, addressing the charges on merits. He also objected to the competence of the Governing Body and of the Director to initiate and continue the proceedings; however, the said objection was not accepted. An Inquiry Officer was thereafter appointed, and the inquiry culminated in findings adverse to the Petitioner. A show cause notice proposing the penalty of dismissal was issued, and on 8th January, 2013, the Governing Body resolved to dismiss the Petitioner from service. The formal order of dismissal dated 18th February, 2013 was passed by the Governing Body of VPCI.

2.4. The Petitioner assailed the aforesaid dismissal in W.P.(C) 2110/2013. By judgment dated 29th January, 2014, this Court set aside the order of dismissal, on one issue alone. The Court held that the Petitioner, being governed by the 1971 Rules, was subject to Rule 69 , which mandated that disciplinary proceedings be instituted by the Executive Council or by an authority duly empowered by it through a general or special order. It was noted that no explicit resolution of the Executive Council delegating such power to the Governing Body had been placed on record. The Court also declined to accept the Respondents’ contention that the status of the Governing Body as the appointing authority conferred disciplinary authority upon it. It was observed that such a contention might have had relevance in the absence of governing rules, but could not be sustained where the appointment itself was regulated by the 1971 Rules. On this limited ground, the dismissal was set aside. At the same time, liberty was reserved to the Respondents to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, if otherwise permissible in law, subject to the requisite authority being conferred by the Executive Council through an appropriate general or special resolution. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

“5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is not in dispute that the petitioner falls in the category of non teaching staff / administrative staff.

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