JUDGMENT

RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.

1. The captioned Criminal Leave Petition has been filed, seeking conviction of the respondent for the offences punishable under Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [“POCSO Act”] and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC”], and for setting aside the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court in SC No. 692/2017, FIR No. 257/2016, registered at Police Station Kalyan Puri, under Section 6 of POCSO Act and under Section 376 IPC, whereby the learned Trial Court has acquitted the respondent of the aforesaid offences, while convicting him under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

2. Vide judgment dated 02^nd November, 2021, the learned Trial Court held the respondent guilty and convicted him for the offence under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. However, he was acquitted for the offences punishable under Section 6 POCSO Act and Section 376 IPC. Subsequently, vide Order on Sentence dated 21^st December, 2021, the respondent was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of 5 years and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence punishable under section 10 POCSO Act, and in default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of one month.

3. The Criminal Leave Petition has been filed with a delay of 541 days. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor [“APP”] for the State submitted that the delay occurred on account of the procedural and administrative movement of the file through various departments, including the office of the Chief Prosecutor, Director of Prosecution, Law Department, Office of Chief Secretary and the Office of the Hon’ble Lt. Governor, for obtaining the requisite approvals. It was submitted that the concerned learned APP, who was marked the case, was also on a medical leave for a substantial period, which contributed to the delay. It was submitted that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate, and that grave prejudice would be caused if the matter is not heard on merits, and is dismissed just on technical grounds, particularly when the impugned judgment suffers from serious infirmities affecting the administration of justice.

4. The learned APP submitted that there is a good case on merits and that the judgment is contrary to the settled principles of law and is based on conjectures and surmises. It was contended that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidentiary value of the statement of the child victim recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“Cr.P.C.”], as also the testimony recorded before the Court. It was argued that the victim had consistently stated that the respondent had removed his underwear and inserted his finger into his anus and had also narrated the complete incident to the police officials. The victim remained consistent on material particulars and no contradiction affecting the substratum of the prosecution case could be pointed out. The minor discrepancies in the testimony of a child victim, aged about 10 years, could not have formed the basis for acquitting the respondent of the offences punishable under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. It was, therefore, contended that the evidence on record clearly establishes the commission of penetrative sexual assault, and that the learned Trial Court gravely erred in confining the conviction only to Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

5. It was further submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the conduct of the respondent clearly reflected the requisite mens rea and the acts attributed to him squarely attracted the ingredients of Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 IPC. It was further submitted that the learned Trial Court placed undue reliance upon the medical examination report, despite the medical examination having been conducted after a delay of about 11-12 days from the date of the incident. It was also contended that in cases involving child sexual