2026 Supreme(Online)(Del) 14497
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
V. Kameswar Rao, Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, JJ
RHINO FINANCE PRIVATE LIMITED – Appellant
Versus
GOLDEN BAG TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED – Respondent
FAO(OS) (COMM) 121/2026 | CM APPL. 27503-27506/2026
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Dinesh Agnani, Amit K. Pateria, Rajat Maken
For the Respondents: None
The limitation period for challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, begins upon transmission/delivery of the award; unsubstantiated technical failures or a lawyer's failure to notify the client do not extend this statutory period.
Headnote:(A) Arbitration - Limitation - Section 34 - Transmission of Award - The limitation period for challenging an arbitral award commences from the date the signed copy is transmitted; claims of non-functional email servers without cogent evidence are insufficient to extend the limitation period. (Para 2, 13, 14)
(B) Service of Award - Change of Address - Failure to formally communicate a change of address to the arbitrator does not excuse the delivery of the award to the last known address on record. (Para 8, 9, 13)
(C) Professional Negligence - Counsel's Receipt - Receipt of the award by the counsel constitutes notice to the party; the counsel's failure to inform the client does not stop the limitation clock. (Para 10)
Issues: Whether the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was barred by limitation despite the appellant's claims of non-receipt of the award.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. procedural history and the initial dismissal of the section 34 petition based on limitation. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5) |
| 2. arguments regarding the date of receipt of the award, email failures, and change of address. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11) |
| 3. the court's determination that limitation begins upon transmission of the award regardless of client-counsel communication gaps. (Para 12 , 13 , 14) |
| 4. final dismissal of the appeal and pending applications. (Para 15) |
(ORAL)
1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the order dated 09.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act, 1996), whereby the appellant had challenged the Arbitral Award dated 07.10.2023.
2. The petition was dismissed, primarily of the ground that the petition is barred by limitation as prescribed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the petition has stated the following:-
“13. However, it emerges from the record that the Petitioner, from the very same email address from which it claims non-receipt of the award, addressed emails to the learned Sole Arbitrator dated 07.12.2023 and 23.12.2023 [Annexed as Doc PIA-2 and Doc PIA-4 respectively, of the "Affidavit dated 05.10.2024 on behalf of the Petitioner"].
14. By way of the aforesaid e-mail communications, the Petitioner specifically requested the learned Arbitrator to provide a signed copy of the arbitral award.
15. The fact that the Petitioner was able to successfully communicate from the said email address from December, 2023 onwards clearly belies the submission advanced on its behalf that the email system was non-functional during October, 2023, when the award was transmitted.
16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further seeks to rely upon certain averments contained in the written submissions to the effect that the licence granted to the Petitioner by the Reserve Bank of India stood cancelled owing to complaints made by borrowers/end users. Based upon that, it is contended that the cancellation of the licence rendered the Petitioner's email systems inoperative, thereby preventing receipt of the arbitral award.
17. This Court is unable to accept the said submissions. Apart from the fact that no material has been placed on record to substantiate the assertion that the Petitioner's email address was non-functional during the relevant period, the subsequent email communications sent by the Petitioner itself from the same address wholly undermine the plea sought to be advanced.
18. In the absence of any cogent material demonstrating that the Petitioner was prevented, for reasons beyond its control, from receiving the arbitral award at the time it was duly transmitted, the explanation offered for the delay cannot be accepted as bona fide or sufficient.
19. At this stage, this Court expresses its strong disapproval of the fact that, despite it being an admitted position that the arbitral award was passed on 07.10.2023 and that the present petition was filed only on 01.04.2024, the Petitioner deliberately chose not to file any application seeking condonation of delay at the time of institution of the petition, notwithstanding its intention to advance various purported explanations for the delay. It was only after the matter was listed and pursuant to subsequent directions of this Court that an affidavit purporting to explain the delay came to be filed, which, in the opinion of this Court, is wholly unsatisfactory and insufficient for the reasons discussed hereinabove.
20. Consequently, this Cami has no hesitation in holding that the present petition has been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34 of the Act, and is, therefore, barred by limitation.
CONCLUSION:
21. In view of the foregoing, the present petition under Section 34 of the Act, stands dismissed as being barred by limitation, having been filed beyond the period pr