1. Suit seeking injunction against advertiser for disparaging products via digital platforms and hoardings. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 )
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2026 Supreme(Online)(Del) 17846
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
A. J. Bhambhani, J
Hindustan Unilever Limited – Appellant
Versus
Kwick Living (I) Private Limited – Respondent
CS(COMM) 904/2026 | I.A.22515/2026
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Amit Sibal, Swathi Sukumar, Saikrishna Rajagopal, Sidharth Chopra, Nitin Sharma, Sneha Jain, Vivek Ayyagari, Abhinav Bhalla, Saksham Dhingra, Smriti Nair
For the Respondents: Chander M. Lall, Shwetasree Majumder, Prithvi Singh, Jahnvi Chadha, Rohan Krishna Seth, Devyani Nath, Krtin Bhasin, Ritwik Marwaha, Vanshika Singh, Annanya Mehan
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Amit Sibal, Swathi Sukumar, Saikrishna Rajagopal, Sidharth Chopra, Nitin Sharma, Sneha Jain, Vivek Ayyagari, Abhinav Bhalla, Saksham Dhingra, Smriti Nair
For the Respondents: Chander M. Lall, Shwetasree Majumder, Prithvi Singh, Jahnvi Chadha, Rohan Krishna Seth, Devyani Nath, Krtin Bhasin, Ritwik Marwaha, Vanshika Singh, Annanya Mehan
The court identified conflicting precedents regarding territorial jurisdiction in IP suits, specifically concerning corporate plaintiffs with multiple offices and the threshold for internet-based jurisdiction, and referred these questions to a Larger Bench for determination.
Headnote:(A) Territorial Jurisdiction - Corporate Plaintiff - Principal Office vs. Subordinate Office - Conflict between the restrictive rule in Sanjay Dalia (requiring suit at principal office if part cause of action arises there) and broader interpretations allowing concurrent jurisdiction. (Para 34, 50)
(B) Internet-based Jurisdiction - Cause of Action - Conflict between the "purposeful availment/targeting" test in Banyan Tree and the "interactive website/transactional capability" test in World Wrestling Entertainment and Kohinoor Seed Fields. (Para 36, 43, 44)
(C) Interplay of Statutes - Section 20 CPC vs. Special IP Statutes - Whether the provisions of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act are additional to or override the general rules of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Para 35, 53.1)
Issues: Whether the court has territorial jurisdiction over the suit given the corporate structure of the plaintiff and the nature of the digital advertisement campaign.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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practice and procedure
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civil procedure
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territorial jurisdiction
- cause of action (Para 8, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52)
- corporation's place of business (Para 11, 12, 18, 24, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52)
- internet-based jurisdiction (Para 12, 13, 14, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52)
- forum shopping (Para 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52)
-
territorial jurisdiction
-
civil procedure
- intellectual property law
Table of Contents
2. Defendant challenged territorial jurisdiction; plaintiff asserted jurisdiction based on cause of action in Delhi. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 )
3. Conflicting judicial interpretations on territorial jurisdiction in IP suits under Section 20 CPC, Trade Marks Act, and Copyright Act. (Para 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 )
4. Purposive interpretation of Section 134 and Section 62 restricts forum choice when cause of action arises where plaintiff has principal office. (Para 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 )
5. Matter referred to Larger Bench for authoritative determination of jurisdictional conflicts in IP suits with online elements. (Para 55 , 56 )
6. How do Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act interact with Section 20 CPC for territorial jurisdiction?
The provisions are in addition to Section 20 CPC, but a plaintiff with principal office where cause of action arises must sue there, not at a distant subordinate office, to prevent forum-shopping. (Para 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 )
7. What constitutes sufficient digital activity to establish territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC in IP disputes?
Mere website accessibility does not suffice. The test requires purposeful availment and specific targeting of the forum state by the defendant, and for the effects test, injury within the forum must be shown. (Para 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 )
8. Must a corporate plaintiff necessarily sue only where its principal or registered office is located when a part of the cause of action arises there?
Yes, under the restrictive reading of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia. The corporation cannot then abandon that forum in favor of a distant subordinate office. (Para 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 )
9. Does a plaintiff having an interactive website where commercial transactions can be concluded 'carry on business' for jurisdictional purposes at every place of access?
Yes, per World Wrestling Entertainment and Kohinoor Seed Fields. In the e-commerce era, an interactive website enabling transactions equates to a brick-and-mortar marketplace wherever accessible, expanding potential forums for suit. (Para 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 )
10. Can a plaintiff sue at a place where it has only a subordinate office if the cause of action also arises at its principal office?
No, according to Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction. The restrictive interpretation prohibits forum-shopping by preventing a plaintiff from ignoring the principal office forum when a part of the cause of action also arises there. (Para 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 )
J U D G M E N T
A. J. BHAMBHANI, J
By way of the present suit the plaintiff inter-alia seeks a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from broadcasting, publishing, hosting or communicating to the public the impugned advertisement campaign, styled as a public awareness initiative under the banner “War on What’s Hidden”, which the plaintiff claims targets and disparages the plaintiff’s products ‘Vim’ and ‘Surf Excel’ on the basis of unsubstantiated and misleading claims. It is the plaintiff’s claim that the impugned advertisement campaign is being run on billboards, various social media platforms, and the defendant’s web-site.
2. Summons in the suit were issued vidé order dated 19.08.2026.
3. At the very outset, at the stage of issuance of summons, Mr. Chander Lall, learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant, had raised a preliminary objection, submitting that this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. However, summons were issued in the matter and considering the objection so raised, this court granted to the defendant a day’s time to file their reply to the interim injunction application bearing I.A. No. 22515/2026. Reply dated 20.08.2026 and rejoinder dated 24.08.2026 have been filed by the respective parties.
4. This court has heard Mr. Lall, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant and Mr. Amit Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff on the preliminary objection, at length. Though learned senior counsel have also canvassed the merits of their respective contentions relating to the interim order sought, this court would first deal only with the aspect of its territorial jurisdiction over the matter. Vidé order dated 24.08.2026 judgment was reserved on the aforesaid limited aspect.
5. Since the preliminary objection was raised by the defendant, the court has set out the submissions made by learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant first.
6. Before setting-out the submissions made on behalf of the parties, it may be observed that considering the challenge canvassed by the plaintiff to the impugned advertisement campaign, the issue of territorial jurisdiction of this court over the present suit would turn upon three principal provisions: one, section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999; two, section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957; and three, section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’), in particular section 20(c) thereof.
7. The three provisions are extracted below for ease of reference:
also a subordinate office, at such place.(emphasis supplied)
8. Furthermore, it is also relevant to extract the ‘cause of action’ and the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ paras of the plaint, which read as follows:
“XIV. CAUSE OF ACTION
152. The cause of action for instituting the present suit first arose on 14th August 2026, when the Defendant commenced telecasting and disseminating the impugned comparative advertisements, which denigrate and disparage the Plaintiff’s products sold under the well-known marks VIM and SURF EXCEL, across various social media platforms such as YouTube and Instagram and their webpage. The cause of action further arose when the Defendant caused the impugned comparative advertisements to be displayed on hoardings and banners installed at strategic locations and crowded public places, thereby further denigrating and disparaging the Plaintiff’s goods. The cause of action also arose when the Defendant uploaded and published the impugned comparative advertisements on its website, together with four test reports purportedly relied upon by it, thereby continuing to denigrate and disparage the Plaintiff’s goods. The cause of action is continuous and recurring and continues to subsist for so long as the Defendant continues to publish, telecast, disseminate or display the impugned comparative advertisements and related materials.
153. The cause of a
