THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL :

Heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record on I.A. No. 297 of 2026 Application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 91 days in preferring an Appeal against the order dated 24th December, 2025 passed by Learned DRT -1 Kolkata in I.A. No. 3166 of 2025, I.A. No. 3167 of 2025, I.A. No. 2591 of 2025 and I.A. No. 3584 of 2025 arising out of S.A. No. 387 of 2025.

2. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the issue of maintainability of the S.A. is being raised by the Appellants from the very beginning and different I.As are being filed by the SARFAESI Applicants one by one. Since all the I.A.s were pending and the matter was extensively heard by the Learned DRT, hence, Appeal could not be filed. But when an order dated 28th April 2026 is passed by the Learned DRT, then it was found that the impugned order dated 24th December, 2025 should also be challenged. It is submitted that the delay of 91 days is not due to any negligence on the part of the Appellant, rather, it was on the basis of advice received by the Appellants. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also in detail argued the matter regarding the pending I.A.s and the orders passed therein by the Learned DRT which are not relevant at this point of disposal of Application under Section 5 of Limitation Act.

3. Learned Counsel for the Respondent opposed the prayer and submits that the Appellants have not challenged the impugned order passed by Learned DRT. Rather, when they sought the advice of their Counsel to challenge the order dated 24th December, 2025, only then it was decided to file the instant Appeal. Accordingly, no sufficient cause could be shown by the Appellant for condonation of delay of 91 days in preferring the Appeal.

4. Order under challenge is dated 24th December, 2025 while the Appeal was filed on 24th April, 2026. Application for certified copy of the impugned order was filed on 22nd April, 2026. Accordingly, Appellant cannot take any advantage of the time in preparation of the copy of the impugned order.

5. As far as the issue of condonation of delay is concerned, law is very well settled that Appellant has to show the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others -vs- Union of India & Another [(2023) 10 SCC 531] wherein it was held in paragraphs 30 and 32 as under:

“30. X x x condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.”

“32. x x x At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.”

6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State (NCT of Delhi) -vs- Ahmed Jaan [(2008) 14 SCC 582], held that proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent. In para 10 it is held that

“There is no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel could be laid. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.”

7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through LRs -vs- Narasamma (Dead) through LRs [(2013) 11 SCC 341] in para 12 it was held that

“Unless the Respondents are able to show mala fides in not approaching the Court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the Courts while dealing w