GAHC010146022021 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRP/49/2021 M/S VAISHNO DEVI TRADERS PVT. LTD.
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956 HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT NH 37, BELTOLA, GUWAHATI, DIST KAMRUP M ASSAM REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVES MR.
YOUDHISTRA BHAMA, S/O SRI BALWAN BHAMA, RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO. 35 A, RADHA KRISHNA PATH,NEAR INCOME TAX COLONY BANGAON BELTOLA, GUWAHATI, DIST KAMRUPM ASSAM, VERSUS ASHOKA NANDA DAS AND ANR.
S/O LATE J.N DAS, RESIDENT OF S 17, A/5 GF, DLF CITY III, GURGAON, 122002,HARYANA, 2:M/S SOFT DEAL TRADING COMPANY PVT. LTD.
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT HAVING ITS OFFICE AT ACME PLAZA ANDHERI KURLA ROAD ANDHERI (EAST) MUMBAI REPRESENTED BY MS. DEVINA DSOUZ Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. R K BHUYAN Advocate for the Respondent : MR. A C SARMA BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA
['R K BHUYAN', '', 'M KASHYAP', 'A C SARMA', '', 'FOR CAVEATOR']
JUDGMENT
28.10.2021 Heard the learned senior counsel Mr. D. Das, assisted by Mr. R. K. Bhuyan, Advocate for the petitioner. Also heard the learned senior counsel Mr. K.
N.Choudhury, assisted by Mr. G. Bharadwaj, Advocate for the respondent.
This is an application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure whereby the order dated 09.09.2021 passed by the Additional District Judge, Kamrup at Amingaon in Misc. Appeal No.2/2021 is put to challenge.
The facts necessary for disposal of this application under Section 115 of the CPC lies within a short campus- the present petitioner filed a suit being TS 156/2019 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Kamrup at Amingaon against the present respondents seeking a decree of declaration, specific performance of contract, cancellation of a Deed of Agreement for sale and for injunction. Along with the said suit, a petition under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC read with Section 151 of the said Code was filed and this petition was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 190/2019. The Court of the Civil Judge, after hearing both sides granted the ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents, particularly, the respondent no. 1 from alienating and transferring the suit property to any other person and also directed the respondents not to disturb the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the suit property.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent no. 1 filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Kamrup at Amingaon and the appeal was registered as Misc. Appeal No. 02/2021. It may be stated that the respondent no. 1 also filed a petition before the appellate Court for seeking a stay of the said order dated 21.01.2021 and this petition was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 4/2021. While disposing of Misc. (J) Case No. 4/2021, the appellate Court held that the case presented by the present petitioner has all the necessary ingredients for granting temporary injunction. Interestingly, the same appellate Court on 09.09.2021 while disposing of the Misc. Appeal No. 2/2021 held that the petitioner’s case does not have any of the necessary ingredients for granting ad-interim injunction.
The appellate Court also held that according to Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, the contracts, for violation of which monetary compensation is adequate relief, are not enforceable in law.
The learned senior counsel Mr. Das has pointed out that the appellate Court has relied upon the old Specific Relief Act of 1963. Mr.Das has submitted that on
01.102018, the aforesaid Specific Relief Act of 1963 was amended whereby major changes were incorporated in Section 14 of the said Act.
In fact, Section 14 (a) of the old Act is no more available in Section 14 of the new Act. In the said Clause it was stated that a contract for the non performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief such contracts are not enforceable. After the amendment of the Specific Relief Act that Clause is no more available in Section 14 of the Act.
Mr. Das has pointed out that it is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. In order to buttress his argument, Mr. Das has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Ex-Capt. K.C. Arora v.
State of Haryana, (1984) 3 SCC 281. Paragraph 15 of the judgment is quoted as under-
“15. It may be pointed out at the very outset that the Parliament as also the State Legislature have plenary powers to legislate within the field of legislation committed to them and subject to certain constitutional restrictions they can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is, however, a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect the vest