4. On receipt of the process, the petitioner appeared before the learned Court below, filed his written objection, and after hearing both sides, the learned JMFC passed an order dated 15.09.2023, whereby, Rs. 5000/- (Rupees Five thousand) was granted towards monthly maintenance for the respondent No. 1 and directed the petitioner to pay compensation of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees Forty thousand) to the aggrieved/respondent No. 1.

5. On being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the learned trial Court below dated 15.09.2023, the present petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 29 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 for setting aside the aforesaid judgment and order by the learned Court below.

6. The learned Appellate Court i.e., the learned Additional Session Judge No. 2, Nagaon had accordingly admitted the appeal subject to payment of 50% of monthly maintenance to the aggrieved/respondent No. 1 till disposal of the appeal without giving any due consideration to the contention of the petitioner.

7. The petitioner, being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 16.10.2023 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge No. 2, has preferred the present petition.

8. Mr. Darakullah, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the payment of Rs. 5000/- (Rupees Five thousand) as maintenance and Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees Forty thousand) as compensation was fixed based on unsubstantiated assertions by respondent No. 1, without considering the petitioner’s source of income. Furthermore, the learned trial Court below also failed to consider that respondent No. 1 as PW-1, had deposed before the Court that she was previously married to one, namely, Sirajuddin of Rangaloo, prior to her marriage with the present appellant, and had lived with him as husband and wife for about 14 years. Moreover, she had neither obtained a decree of divorce nor applied for divorce before any competent Court or Kazi office from her ex- husband prior to solemnization of marriage with the petitioner which already means that her earlier marriage is still subsists.

9. He further submitted that as per Mohammaden Law or any other law, a woman cannot marry another person during subsistence of earlier marriage, and the subsequent marriage is considered to be void. Further the admission of marriage of the respondent No. 1 is subsequently corroborated by PW-2, who is the sister of the respondent No. 1 and thus, the Domestic Violence Act shall not come into play in these circumstances and therefore, respondent No. 1 is not entitled to any kind of relief under this act. He further submitted that the order of the learned Appellate Court dated 16.10.2023, arising out of DV Case No.

609/2018 is liable to be set aside and quashed.

10. Mr. Darakullah, learned counsel for the petitioner, further relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1991) SCC 2 375 (K. Vimal vs. K. Veeraswamy) to substantiate his plea, wherein, it has been held that “Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. When an attempt is made by the husband to negative the claim of the neglected wife depicting her as a kept-mistress on the specious plea that he was already married, the court would insist on strict proof of the earlier marriage. The term wife in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, includes a woman who has been divorced by a husband or who has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. The woman not having the legal status of a wife is thus brought within the inclusive definition of the term wife consistent with the objective. However, under the law a second wife whose marriage is void on account of the survival of the first marriage is not a legally wedded wife and is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under this provisi