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2025 Supreme(Online)(Gau) 7896

HIGH COURT OF GAUHATI
MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER GTL INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED AND ANR – Appellant
Versus
MD. SAMIQUL HUSSAIN – Respondent
CRP(IO) / 369 / 2024



appears that the suit property is situated within the Lakhimpur Town and would come within the purview of the Assam Urban Area Rent Control Act, 1972 (for short ‘Act of 1972’) in terms with Section 2(g) of the Act of 1972.

6. A perusal of the plaint reveals that the plaintiff had entered into a lease agreement with one M/S Dishnet Wireless Ltd. dated 10.08.2007 thereby leasing out the property as described the Schedule to the plaint. It was alleged in the plaint that the said M/S Dishnet Wireless Ltd. was taken over by the M/S GTL Infrastructure Ltd. and the said company continued to remain as a tenant of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that that the defendants in the suit were defaulter in payment of rent and further, the defendants are liable to be also evicted in terms of section 5(1)(a) of the Act of 1972 which pertains to violation of the provisions of Sub-Sections (m), (o)

and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer Property Act, 1882.

7. The defendants appeared in the suit and filed an application under Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “the Act of 1996’) which was registered and numbered as Misc. Case No.

52/2022.

8. In view of the change in the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court on account of the amendment to the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, the suit was transferred to the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Lakhimpur at North Lakhimpur (for short ‘the learned Trial Court’) and the suit was re-numbered as Title Suit No. 44/2020.

9. The plaintiff filed his written objection to the application filed under Sections 5 and 8 of the Act of 1996. The learned Trial Court i.e. the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Lakhimpur at North Lakhimpur vide an order dated 20.03.2023 dismissed the said application filed under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 on the ground that as the lease was for the period from 12 years i.e. from 10.08.2007 and 11.08.2007 and the lease expired on 10.08.2019 and 11.08.2019 respectively. The learned Trial Court opined that as there was nothing on record to show that lease agreement or the license agreement were renewed and the suit having been instituted after the period of the expiry of the lease agreement and the license agreement for eviction of the tenant and for mesne profit, the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to decide the dispute and accordingly the said application under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 was dismissed.

10. Being aggrieved, the petitioners herein preferred an Appeal under Section 37(1)(a) of the Act of 1996 before the Court of the Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Lakhimpur at North Lakhimpur. The Appeal was registered and numbered as Misc. Appeal No.02/2023.

11. The learned Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lakhimpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned First Appellate Court) vide an order date is 06.01.2024 dismissed the said appeal. The learned First Appellate Court opined that for referring the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act of 1996, the standard of scrutiny to examine the non-arbitrability of a claim by the Reference Court is only prima facie. It was observed that the Reference Court has to confine to only a first review and the Court has to prima facie find that the valid arbitration agreement exists.

The learned First Appellate Court further upon taking note of the agreements dated 10.08.2007 and 11.08.2007 opined that the term of the lease and license were for a period of 12 years which expired on 10.08.2019 and 11.08.2019 and thereafter, there being no renewal of the agreements on record observed that the cumulative fallout of the same was that the arbitration clause in the expired/terminated lease agreement cannot be said to be either existent or valid. Accordingly, the learned First Appellate Court affirmed the said order. It is under such circumstances, the present proceedings has been filed by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of t

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