N.I. Act, 1881 and Section 420/34 of the Indian Penal Code and was transferred to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar, for disposal.

II. On 9/7/2012, cognizance of offence under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was taken against accused/Petitioner No.1, and cognizance of offence u/s 420 IPC was taken against all the accused person.

III. Thereafter, by an order dated 9/6/2014 passed in N.I. Case No.

55/2012, the learned Trial Court (Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar) discharged the Accused/petitioners No. 2 & 3 from the offence u/s 420/34 IPC and proceeded against the accused/petitioner No.1 u/s 138 NI Act.

IV. Against the order dated 9/6/2014, the Complainant/Opposite party No.1 preferred a Revision petitioner registered as Crl. Revision No. 176/14 before the Session Judge, Cachar. By the impugned order dated 29/5/2015 passed in Crl. Revision No. 176/14, learned Additional Session Judge, Cachar allowed the revision by setting aside the order dated 9/6/2014 passed in N.I. Case No. 55/2012 (Annexure-3) and directed the learned trial court to consider the matter afresh, after considering all the evidence adduced by the complainant and after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the parties and to proceed with the case.

V. Thereafter, the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cachar, by the impugned order dated 20/10/2016, passed in N.I. Case No. 55/2012 framed charges under Section 420 IPC against all 3 accused persons i.e. petitioner herein, and charge u/s 138 N.I. Act was framed separately against accused/petitioner No.1 Nizame Uddin Barbhuiya. Challenging both the orders i.e. order dated 29/5/2015 passed in Crl. Revision No. 176/14, learned Additional Session Judge, Cachar and order dated 20/10/2016 passed in N.I. Case No. 55 of 2012, the present petition is filed before this Court.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner fundamentally argues the following: I. Both the offences under Section 420 IPC and Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 are distinct and different offence, and same cannot be tried in the same trial. It is his contention that both are different in the procedure required to be followed for conducting the prosecution; standard of proof are also different, including the requirement of mens rea. In support of such contention, the learned counsel places reliance on the ratio laid down by a coordinate bench in Manik Chandra Hazarika vs Bibhison Pegu & another reported in 2012 (5) GLR 623 and by Ho’ble Apex Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel vs State of Gujarat and another reported in (2012)7 SCC 621.

II. On merit, the learned counsel for the petitioners argues that a bare perusal of the complaint as well as other material available in the record, no prima facie case under section 420 IPC is made out. There is no ingredient of Section 420 IPC in the complaint warranting framing charge against the petitioners.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent argues the following:

I. The provision of section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 dealing with "trial of more than one offence" and subsection (1) of the said section provides that if, in one series of acts so connected to form the same transaction, more offences than one is committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence and therefore, there is no bar of a common trial under section 420 IPC and 138 NI Act.

II. The "offence", as defined under section 2(n) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 means "any act or omission punishable by any law for the time being in force and therefore, charges framed under both laws in the same proceeding is legally tenable and as such, the Criminal Petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

III. Specific statements are made as regards ingredients of Section 420 of IPC in the complaint, and therefore, the learned Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of the offences under Section 420 IPC.

6. From the argument advanced, it