Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2026 Supreme(Gau) 1180

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT, (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
DEVASHIS BARUAH, J.

Guwahati Welfare Association For Rickshaw Drivers, Represented By Its President Sri Madan Chandra Boro – Petitioner
Versus
The State Of Assam, Represented By The Chief Secretary To The Government Of Assam And Ors. – Respondents
WP(C)/1430 of 2023, WP(C)/1648 of 2023
Decided On : 15-06-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Mr. P.K. Roychoudhury, Senior Advocate, Mr. R. Sarma, MS. J. Tamuli
For the Respondents: Mr. S. Bora Standing Counsel, GMC, Ms. MD Bora, Standing Counsel, Transport Deptt.

A municipal authority lacks the statutory power to regulate, restrict, or enforce technical modifications on vehicles, such as the fitting of electric motors, under its general taxation or licensing powers, as such regulatory oversight is reserved for specialized transport departments.

Headnote:(A) Municipal Regulation - Licensing and taxation powers - Scope of authority - Powers granted to a local body must be specifically enumerated in legislation - Power to tax does not implicitly include power to regulate vehicle safety, mechanical design, or structural modifications - Statutory authority limited to taxation and basic licensing provisions as per governing local laws. (Paras 8, 9, 11, 14)

(B) Statutory Interpretation - Domain of regulatory authority - Compliance with vehicle safety standards and mechanical specifications remains the jurisdiction of designated transport and governmental departments rather than local municipal bodies, unless otherwise specified by law. (Paras 12, 14)

Facts of the case:
An order was issued by a local municipal authority directing the removal of electric motors from retrofitted tricycles, citing safety concerns and non-compliance with certain vehicle regulations. Aggrieved operators challenged the legality of this administrative directive, arguing that the local municipal body lacked the statutory jurisdiction to enforce substantive mechanical changes to their vehicles.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the governing municipal legislation only confers powers to levy taxes on vehicles and manage the issuance of licenses. It holds no authority to regulate technical vehicular standards, dictate mechanical configurations, or determine the safety profile of vehicles. Oversight regarding vehicular roadworthiness is reserved for specialized state transport departments.

Issues: Whether the local municipal authority possesses the statutory jurisdiction to issue administrative directives regarding the removal of electric motors or the regulation of technical design features of vehicles.

Ratio Decidendi: A municipal body’s regulatory powers are strictly restricted to the substantive provisions of its governing legislation. Since the relevant act only grants the power to impose taxes, any attempt to regulate technical aspects of vehicle construction or safety constitutes an act in excess of the authority's legal jurisdiction.

Result: Impugned order quashed; writ petitions allowed.

Table of Content
1. nature of the dispute involving gmc jurisdiction over retrofitted electric rickshaws. (Para 1 , 2 , 3)
2. parties' contentions regarding definitions of motor vehicles and municipal authority. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 13)
3. analysis of gmc's enabling statutes regarding taxation versus regulatory power. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11)
4. lack of municipal jurisdiction to regulate vehicle safety standards outside existing statutes. (Para 12 , 14)
5. quashing of the impugned order and allocation of regulatory authority. (Para 15)

JUDGMENT :

DEVASHIS BARUAH, J.

Heard Mr. PK Roychoudhury, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. R Sarma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in WP(C)No.1430/2023 and Mr. AR Bhuyan, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S Laskar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in WP(C)No.1648/2023. Also heard Mr. S Bora, the learned Standing Counsel, who appears on behalf of the Guwahati Municipal Corporation (for short, ‘the GMC’) and Ms. MD Bora, the learned Standing Counsel, who appears on behalf of the Transport Department, Govt. of Assam.

2. The petitioners in both the writ petitions are aggrieved by the actions on the part of the Commissioner, GMC in issuance of an order dated 28.12.2022, whereby directions were issued that the Rickshaw Retrofitted with Electrical Motor should remove the motors within 7(seven) days from the date of the order failing which appropriate action would be taken.

3. A question arises in the instant proceedings as to whether the GMC has the power to issue such a direction vide the order dated 28.12.2022.

4. It is the case of the petitioners that these specialized Rickshaws which are Retrofitted with Electric Motors are actually known as the Dipbahan Tricycle Rickshaws and would come within the ambit of Rule 2 (u) of the Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (for short, the Rules of 1989). However, it is the specific stand of the Transport Department that these specialized Rickshaws Retrofitted with Electric Motors would not come within the ambit of Motor Vehicle inasmuch as, it does not fit into the definition of e-Rickshaw as defined under Rule 2(cb) of the Rules of 1989 or Battery Operated Vehicle as defined under Rule 2(u) of the Rules of 1989.

5. This Court also has taken note of the stand of the GMC wherein it is mentioned that the impugned order was passed on the ground that the said specialized Rickshaws are unsafe for commuters and in order to effect compliance to Rule 126 of the Rules of 1989.

6. This Court has heard Mr. S Bora, the learned Standing Counsel of GMC who submits that power of the Commissioner GMC to issue the impugned order dated 28.12.2022 is derived from the ‘Guwahati Municipal Corporation (Licensing of Rickshaws and Rickshaw Pullers) Bye-Laws 1976’ which are made in terms with Section 167 of the GUWAHATI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT , 1971 (for short, the ‘Act of 1971’).

7. Taking into account the above submissions, this Court finds it relevant to take note of Section 167 of the Act of 1971 which is reproduced hereinunder:

“167. Tax on certain vehicles, boats and animals.-(1) Except as hereinafter provided, a tax rates not exceeding those specified in the First Schedule shall be levied on vehicles, boats and animals of the description specified in the Schedule, when kept for use in the city for the conveyance of passengers or goods in the case of vehicles and boats and for riding, racing, draught or burden, in case of animals.

(2) The Corporation may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, increase the rates of tax specified in the schedule, in relation to any animal, class of vehicle or boat.

Explanation.-A vehicle, boat or animal kept outside the limits of the city but regularly used within such limits shall be deemed to be kept in the city.”

8. A perusal of the above-quoted provisions would show that by virtue of Section 167 of the Act of 1971, a power is conferred upon the GMC to impose a ta

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