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2024 Supreme(Online)(GUJ) 16865

HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
GITA GOPI, J
JUJAR FIRDOSBHAI BURAJIWALA – Appellant
Versus
STEVENKUMAR RAFAYEL PARMAR – Respondent
C/CA/2045/2024



Petitioner Advocates:NISHIT A BHALODI(9597) ,Respondent Advocate:

The court emphasized a liberal approach in condoning delays under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, prioritizing substantial justice over technicalities.

Headnote:(A) Indian Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Application filed for condonation of delay of 365 days in filing First Appeal due to applicant being a minor and lack of funds for court fees - Court emphasizes the need for a liberal approach in condoning delays to ensure substantial justice is served. (Paras 2, 3)

(B) Judicial approach - The court reiterates that the judiciary should prioritize substantial justice over technicalities, stating that a litigant does not benefit from delay and that every day's delay must be explained in a rational manner. (Paras 3.1, 3.2)

Facts of the case:
The applicant, being a minor at the time of the accident, faced delays in filing the appeal due to financial constraints for court fees.

Findings of Court:
The court found the reasons for the delay to be sufficiently explained and thus condoned the delay of 365 days in filing the First Appeal.

Issues: The main issue was whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned based on the applicant's circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the power to condone delay should be exercised liberally to ensure that justice is not denied due to technicalities, emphasizing that substantial justice must prevail.

Result: Delay of 365 days in filing the First Appeal is condoned.

ORDER

1. The present application has been filed for condonation of delay of 365 days caused in filing the First Appeal.

2. Learned advocate for the applicant states that the applicant was minor at the time of accident, and the compensation amount deposited has not been disbursed, and, thus stated that the applicant had no money to pay the court fees and other expenses, and after making arrangement of funds for court fess and other expenses, the delay has occured.

3. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 it has been observed as under :-

    “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
    But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made.

Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A

litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”

4. Considering the averments made in the application and as the delay is sufficiently explained and in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay of 365 days caused in filing the First Appeal is condoned.

 

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