2024 Supreme(Online)(GUJ) 11482
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 85 of 2024 ==========================================================
VAISHALI RAKESH VAGHELA & ANR.
Versus RAKESHKUMAR KANTILAL VAGHELA & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR MUSAIB I SHAIKH(10565) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,2 for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4 ==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI Date : 29/07/2024
ORAL ORDER
1. Heard learned advocate for the appellants.
2. In this Appeal from Order, challenge is made to the order dated 30.03.2024 passed below Notice of Motion in Civil Suit No.132 of 2024.
3. Suit of the plaintiff is that she is wife of defendant no.1 and daughter in law of defendant nos.2 and 3. Moreover, she lived with Rakeshbhai but because of matrimonial discord, dispute arose and she apprehended that she will be thrown out from matrimonial home without following due procedure of law. She filed the Civil Suit before the learned Trial Court and along with suit, Notice of Motion was also moved. Notice of motion was dismissed by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, present Appeal from Order.
4. Learned Trial Judge has given following reasons to discard Notice of motion in para 5. It is in Gujarati language, for better understanding, it is translated in English as under :-
"(5) On considering the facts of the case in hand, documentary evidence has been produced from the list at Exh-4 regarding the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant of this case and the party statement made by the plaintiff about the plaintiff residing in the claimed property. However, no fact as to who is the owner of this disputed property has been disclosed at this stage or no evidence has been produced in this regard. A copy of the tax bill of the property is produced vide Exh 4/1, wherein the name of the respondent No. 2 is mentioned as the owner. Upon considering the fact, if the claimed property belongs to defendant No. 2 i.e. the father-in-law of Plaintiff No. 1 and the grandfather of Plaintiff No. 2, then at this stage the plaintiff cannot, without any supporting evidence, be held to have any right-interest of the kind alleged by the plaintiff in his lifetime. According to established principles, the daughter-in-law does not get any rights in the property of father-in-law during the father-in-law was alive. Therefore, the relief sought by the plaintiff in the present case regarding said property cannot be prima facie considered the case of plaintiff for relief. As per the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, if the property claimed by the plaintiff is a residential property which she can establish in the court, then an appropriate order can be passed as per the provisions of the said Act. Therefore injunction under Section-41(h) of the Specific Relief Act can be refused when alternative effective remedy under other laws are available. As per Section 7(1)(c) of the Court Fees Act, if there is any dispute arising out of marital relationship on the claimed property, then it is also a matter of consideration whether the said suit should be proceeded in Family Court or not. The Ld. Advocate of the plaintiff in this matter submitted that, as the procedure of the Protection of Women Act, 2005 and the procedure of the family court are lengthy, they have immediately made this claim and sought the relief by this application in this court. Along with this application, the plaintiff has submitted a copy of the Criminal Misc. Application No. 1430/2024 filed in the Metropolitan Magistrate's Court at Exh 4/11. In the present application, the plaintiff has claimed the right to the shared "property" and sought an injunction against the transfer, therefore, the case of the plaintiff cannot be prima facie considered for the relief sought in the present application. Eventhough there is no prima facie case, the balance of convenience cannot be held to be in favor of the plaintiff under such circumstances because in addition to live in the common house, the plaintiff can demand for alternate house or rent as per that law. Upon such circumstances, as prima facie case of the plaintiff does not appear, the balance of convenience and inconvenience also does not appear to be in favor of the plaintiff. Further, since the petition of the plaintiff is not likely to suffer immeasurable loss in money if the temporary injunction as sought is not gran