Delay of 17 years barred the petitioner from pursuing relief under Article 226 for pensionary benefits previously denied due to resignation.

JUDGEMENT

(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL)

1. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 5.10.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.4477 of 2012; whereby, learned Single Judge for the reasons recorded in the order, has dismissed the petition on the ground of delay.

2. We have heard Mr.Vadera, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.

3. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner was pursuing the remedy inasmuch, after the proposal was rejected in October, 1995, the petitioner had addressed several letters by way of representation in the year 2000.

4. However thereafter as in respect of one co-employee of the petitioner, the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.9572 of 1999 as well as the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.490 of 2000 did not accept the prayer for availability of the pension on the premise that the resignation cannot be equated with the retirement, the petitioner did not take any action.

It is submitted that since the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Shreekumar Jain V/s. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. reported in AIR 2011 SC 2990 has taken the view that the resignation and retirement are the same connotation, the benefit would be available to the petitioner for pensionary benefit.

The petition was preferred before this Court which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground of delay. It was submitted that in view of the above referred decision of the Apex Court in case of Shreekumar Jain (supra) there is a good case on merits and the learned Single Judge has committed an error in dismissing the petition on the ground of delay and therefore, this Court may consider in the present appeal.

5. It appears that it is an admitted position that the petitioner has retired from service as back as from 20th January, 1991. After the rules, in question, came into force, he applied under the scheme by letter dated 8th August, 1995. It is also admitted position that such proposal came to be not accepted and rejected by LIC vide decision dated 5.10.1995. The petitioner, thereafter, did nothing nor raise any grievance at any point of time. Correspondences, as stated by way of representation, are also of the year

2000. Even after year 2000, the petitioner has not preferred any petition nor raised the grievance until 2012 i.e. until the filing of the present petition. If the date of retirement is considered after 1995 for making of the representation, after the rules came into force, then it could be said that the petition was delayed by about 17 years since the proposal came to be dismissed as back as on October,

1995. The contention that some letters were addressed in 2000 even if considered for the sake of examination, no grievance is raised by the petitioner at the relevant point of time. Merely because, in respect of his co-employee, the petition was not entertained by this Court and the decision was further not interfered by the Division Bench of this Court, could not be termed as valid ground for ignoring the aspects of such a long delay. Even after 2000, no action whatsoever was taken by the petitioner till 2012 i.e. till the filing of the main special civil application.

6. Under these circumstances, we find that the ground of delay considered by the learned Single Judge for declining the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constit