The court emphasizes that mere negligence cannot establish a criminal offense under Section 279 IPC without clear evidence of rash driving that endangers life.

ORAL ORDER

1. By way of the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Cr.P.C .”), the petitioner seeks to quash the impugned FIR being C.R. No. I-185 of

2015 registered at Una Police Station.

2. Seeking quashment of the FIR, learned Advocate Mr. Pravin Gondaliya, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the allegations levelled in the impugned FIR are inherently improbable and defy belief. It was further contended that, although this Court is ordinarily restrained from assessing the truthfulness of the allegations at the stage of quashment, a plain reading of the FIR— more particularly when read between the lines—demonstrates that a person of ordinary prudence would not operate a vehicle in such a manner as to knowingly endanger his own safety and sustain injuries.

3. Learned Advocate Mr. Gondaliya further argued that, at best, the incident in question could be categorized as an unfortunate vehicular accident and does not satisfy the essential ingredients of Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code , which pertains to rash or negligent driving on a public way. He candidly admitted that the petitioner was indeed driving the motorcycle at the relevant time, with the complainant occupying the pillion seat. However, he submitted that the petitioner unexpectedly lost control of the motorcycle, resulting in both the petitioner and the complainant falling onto the road. As a consequence, the complainant sustained a fracture injury. Nonetheless, this mishap, though regrettable, cannot be construed to amount to rash and negligent driving in the legal sense of the term.

3.1. In light of the above, it is argued that the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any culpable act under the provisions invoked in the FIR, and accordingly, the continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of law. On such premises, the learned Advocate prayed for allowing the present petition and quashing of the FIR.

4. Despite due service, respondent no. 2 has chosen not to appear before this Court.

5. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Jay Mehta placed reliance on the medical records collected during the course of investigation to contend that the complainant had sustained a fracture of the left femur. According to the learned APP, such nature of injury prima facie suggests that the petitioner was operating the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, and therefore, the prayer for quashment may not be entertained at this stage.

6. Heard learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties. The gravamen of the allegations in the FIR may be briefly summarized as under:

“On 18.09.2014, I, along with Prashantbhai V. Solanki, had gone to Gir Gadhada for work-related purposes. At approximately 5:00 p.m., while returning from Gir Gadhada towards Una on a motorcycle bearing registration number GJ- 11-AP-8613, owned and driven by Prashantbhai Solanki, the said vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. Upon reaching near the Khodiyar Temple, a short distance from Khapat, due to excessive speed and careless driving, the motorcycle overturned, resulting in bodily injuries to me, including a fracture in my left leg. Subsequently, I was admitted to Una Mehta Hospital, where I underwent medical treatment for a period of five days, including a surgical procedure for the said fracture. During this time, Prashantbhai assured me that he would bear the hospital expenses. Owing to this assurance, I refrained from obtaining a discharge summary (D/O) and did not lodge a po