The discretionary power to condone delay requires a satisfactory explanation. Gross negligence or lack of diligence precludes condonation.

ORAL ORDER

1. By way of the present application, the applicant has sought condonation of delay of 407 days in preferring the captioned application challenging the judgment and order dated 15.05.2024 passed by the Family Court, Vadodara in Criminal Misc. Application No.1452 of 2019, whereby the applicant was directed to pay maintenance of Rs.7000/- per month to the opponent–wife from the date of the application, along with costs, under the provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure .

2. Reverting to the facts of the present case and the grounds urged by the applicant, it transpires from paragraphs 4 and 5 of the application that the impugned order was passed on 15.05.2024, whereas the applicant applied for a certified copy on 21.06.2025, i.e., after a delay of 13 months. The same was delivered to the applicant on 16.09.2025. There is no sufficient material on record to show what prevented the applicant from applying for a certified copy earlier. Even after receiving the certified copy on 16.09.2025, the present application was filed presented on 22.09.2025.

3. Having heard the learned advocate for the applicant, this court does not incline to entertain the present application considering the gross delay of 407 days has been caused in preferring the captioned revision application. The approach on the part of the applicant requires to be seen that after passing of the impugned order, nowhere the applicant has stated or contended that as to what kind of steps have been taken by the applicant to challenge the impugned order nor any sort of any material is even placed on record to show that delay was caused bona-fidely.

4. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of K.B.Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) Versus Gyanendra Pratap And Others reported in 2024 (4) SCR 616, after referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, held followings:-

“10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant ( See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi and Others (2021) 18 SCC 384 ).

The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay ( See P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Anr. , (1997) 7 SCC 556 ). Thus, it is apparent that the words sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant ( See Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer. , (2013) 14 SCC 81 ). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 .”

5. Indeed, the liberal approach is required to be adopted for condonation of delay provided delay is sufficiently explained. Fewer days delay can receive the liberal approach; but when there is a gross delay the litigant seeking condonation of delay without explaining it properly and in absence of sufficient explanation, delay is not required to be condoned. No reasons are stated by the applicant and no such satisfactory explanation are mentioned in the application and therefore the present application deserves to be dismissed.

6. In the result, the captioned application fails and is accordingly dismissed. Registry to refuse the filing number of the m