Judicial discretion in condoning delays is contingent on satisfactory explanations; gross negligence negates such discretion.

ORAL ORDER

1. By way of filing the present Criminal Misc. Application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 , seeking condonation of delay of 1001 days caused in preferring Criminal Revision Application under Section 3 97 read with Section 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the judgment and order dated 18.11.2017 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class Sihori in Criminal Case No.520 of 2013, wherein, the Judicial Magistrate First Class Sihori was pleased to acquit the respondents Nos. 2 to 8, from the charges under Sections 498A , 323, 504, 506(2), 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act alongwith order dated 19.03.2019 passed by the

3^rd Additional Sessions Judge, Deesa in Criminal Appeal No.66 of 2017.

2. Heard the learned advocate for the applicant.

3. It is manifestly clear that no reference with regard to the delay caused by the applicant in preferring the present application is made in the present application seeking condonation of delay. Be that as it may, without entering into the technicalities, even grounds agitated does not inspire any confidence moreso, no such ground has been agitated by the applicant so as to establish the factum of the applicant having been prevented by any such inevitable circumstances or causes to file the captioned revision application within a period of limitation.

4. Having heard the learned advocate for the applicant, this court is not inclined to entertain the present application considering the gross delay i.e. 1001 days caused in preferring the revision application. The approach on the part of the applicant requires to be seen that after passing of the impugned order, nowhere the applicant has stated or contended that as to what kind of steps have been taken by the applicant to challenge the impugned order nor any sort of any material is even placed on record to show that delay was caused bona-fidely.

5. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of K.B.Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) Versus Gyanendra Pratap And Others reported in 2024 (4) SCR 616, after referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, held followings:-

“10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant ( See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi and Others (2021) 18 SCC 384 ). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay ( See P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Anr. , (1997) 7 SCC 556 ). Thus, it is apparent that the words sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant ( See Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer ., (2013) 14 SCC 81 ). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 .”

6. Indeed, the liberal approach is required to be adopted for condonation of delay provided delay is sufficiently explained. Fewer days delay can receive the liberal approach; but when there is a gross delay the litigant seeking condonation of delay without explaining it properly and in absence of sufficient explanation, delay is not required to be condoned. No reasons are stated by the applicant and no such satisfactory explanation are mentioned in the applica