CAV JUDGMENT

(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)

1. The Division Bench of this Court, under Rule 5 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993, has referred the following question of law to the Larger Bench:

“Whether the respondent – Institute for Plasma Research can be said to be a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India?”

The above question of law emanates from the decision of the Division Bench judgment dated 04.04.2025 in the case of Himanshu Dineshchandra Parekh vs. Institute for Plasma Research and Ors, reported in 2025 (2) GLH 585, wherein it is held that the Institute for Plasma Research (IPR) is not a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT

2. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pandya, appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the appellant, serving as a Scientific Officer under respondent No.1-Institute for Plasma Research (IPR), seeks relief relating to recovery and re-fixation of pay on the basis of an audit objection, and has assailed the decision of re-fixation of pay and recovery of excess salary, which is the subject matter of the captioned Appeal.

3. It is submitted that the Division Bench in the case of Himanshu Dineshchandra Parekh (supra), while placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors., (2002) 5

SCC 111, along with other decisions, has held that the respondent-IPR is not a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, which is erroneous.

4. It is contended that the Division Bench in the case of Himanshu Dineshchandra Parekh (supra) has premised its opinion mainly on the by-laws and funding of the Institute without examining them threadbare. It is submitted that while observing that there was nothing on record to indicate the extent to which the Central Government funds the respondent-IPR, and on the basis of the by-laws framed by the respondent-IPR, the Division Bench concluded that there was no indication of any regulatory control of the State over the Institute. It is submitted that, without appreciating the by-laws in their true perspective, a conclusion has been drawn that the functional, financial, and administrative control of the Central Government is not pervasive and, at best, could be said to be regulatory in nature, as the Union or Central Government does not interfere in the day-to-day management of the Institute. Further, he has submitted that the Division Bench was influenced by the fact that, since no notification was issued under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, notifying the IPR to be a society governed and controlled by the Government, it could not be

brought within the purview of the Central Administrative Tribunal, which is erroneous.

5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Pandya has submitted that the most vital document establishing that the respondent-IPR falls within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is the Resolution dated 30.10.1996, published in the Gazette of India, which acquires the character of a Notification. It is submitted that by this Resolution, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) took over the administrative control of the respondent-IPR from the Department of Science and Technology with effect from 01.10.1996, and this establishes the direct control of the DAE over the respondent-IPR, thereby indicating that the respondent-IPR is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

6. Reference is also made to the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, as amended up to 05.05.2025, and it is submitted that all matters relating to the personnel of the IPR, Gandhinagar, are under the control of the DAE, under which the appellant is serving. He has further submitted that the said Business Rules categorically mention that the institutions, including the IPR, form an integral part of the

Department, as there exists