IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD F/SECOND APPEAL NO. 28200 of 2024 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 2 of 2024 In F/SECOND APPEAL NO. 28200 of 2024 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI ==========================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No ==========================================================

LHS OF RANACHHODBHAI HIRJIBHAI BHUVA (DECD) & ORS.

Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

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Appearance:

NISHITH K JOSHI(9193) for the Appellant(s) No. 1,1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5,1.6 ==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI Date : 19/02/2026

ORAL JUDGMENT

1. The present Civil Application has been instituted under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) in the captioned Second Appeal, seeking condonation of delay of 1131 days in filing the application for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased Ranchodbhai.

2. For the sake of brevity and convenience, parties to the proceedings are referred to as per their original status before the learned trial Court.

3. It is the case of the applicant that Ranchodbhai, the father of the proposed legal heirs, expired on 24.05.2021. Subsequent thereto, the captioned Second Appeal came to be instituted before this Court. According to the applicant, during the interregnum, as there was no immediate challenge to the impugned judgments and orders passed by the learned Courts Nbelow, the steps for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased Ranchodbhai on record could not be taken within the prescribed period of limitation. Consequently, a Civil Application seeking substitution of the legal heirs has been preferred in the pending Second Appeal, accompanied by the present application for condonation of delay of 1131 days occasioned in filing the substitution application.

4. The applicant has further averred that the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate, but has occurred on account of bona fide circumstances beyond the applicant’s control. Thus, it is prayed that the delay be condoned in the interest of substantial justice and that the Civil Application for bringing the legal heirs on record be allowed.

5. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is as under:-

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—

Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

6. The petitioner was under a legal obligation to satisfactorily demonstrate and convincingly explicate the inordinate delay, and to satisfy this Court that “sufficient cause” existed for not preferring the appeal or moving the requisite application within the statutorily prescribed period of limitation.

6.1. It is no doubt true that, while adjudicating applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts ordinarily adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach, provided the delay is shown to be bona fide and attributable to a cause beyond the control of the litigant. However, delay cannot be condoned by a mere ritualistic invocation of expressions such as “liberal approach,” “justice- oriented approach,” or “substantial justice.” These oft-quoted phrases cannot be employed to dilute, circumvent, or emasculate the substantive mandate of the law of limitation. In Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and O