IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 322 of 2018 =====================================================

BHIKHALAL ALIAS AMRUTLAL GONVINDJI SINCE DIED THROUGH HIS HEIRS & ORS.

Versus NANJI POPAT THAKER & ORS.

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Appearance:

MR ASHISH M DAGLI(2203) for the Applicant(s) No.

1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4 DECEASED LITIGANT THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS/

REPRESTENTATIVES for the Opponent(s) No. 1 =====================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI Date : 19/02/2026

ORAL ORDER

1. This is a revision under Section 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rent Act’) challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Kutch at Bhuj dated 16.03.2018 in a Regular Civil Appeal No.28 of 2007, whereby the learned appellate Court, by allowing the appeal, has reversed the decree of eviction passed by the learned trial Court.

2. The revisionist before this Court is the original plaintiff and the defendant is the original tenant.

3. The plaintiff – landlord has filed the Regular Civil Suit No.414 of 1991 under Section 28 of ‘the Rent Act’ seeking eviction of the tenant from the demised premises being a residential property of House Municipal No.3/10-56 in Bhuj City Survey No.161, Nondh No.3801, Ward No.3 (Demised property).

4. The pleading of the plaintiff, inter-alia is that plaintiff has issued a statutory notice on 11.06.1991 to the defendant claiming arrears of rent for more than 6 months at the monthly rent of Rs.20/- in a tenancy which starts from the first day of the calendar month and ends on the last day of the very calendar month, excluding the tax. According to plaintiff – landlord, the defendant – tenant was in arrears of rent for more than 96 months, commencing from June, 1983 to May, 1991. The plaintiff along with claiming the peaceful and vacant possession of the demised premises on the ground of arrears of rent, also raised other grounds seeking eviction of the tenant.

5. Learned trial Court believed that the case of the plaintiff falls under Section 12(3)(a) of “the Rent Act”. The tenant, despite raising a contention of contractual rent not being a standard rent in a reply to the notice, did not proceed to file an application under Section 11(3) of “the Rent Act” to prove readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent, and therefore, plaintiff’s claim to fix the standard rent is not bonafide. On this premises, the learned Court below decreed the suit. The other grounds pleaded by the plaintiff – landlord have been rejected by the learned appellate Court, except that the plaintiff shall suffer a greater hardship.

6. In an appeal filed by the tenant, learned appellate Court believed that raising of dispute of a standard rent in the reply to the statutory notice is sufficient to bring the case out of the question of Section 12(3)(a) of “the Rent Act” and thus, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.

7. In the background of aforesaid facts, what is missing from the discussion of the learned appellate Court that, whether conditions of Section 12(3)(b) of “the Rent Act” is complied with, and whether the tenant, who raised the dispute of standard rent, to prove the ready and willingness, has deposited the entire arrears of standard rent before first hearing, a pre-condition under Section 12(3)(b) of “the Rent Act” to protect the Tenancy. This issues require to be discussed at length while negating landlord’s claim or eviction under the ground of arrears of rent. Section 12(3)(a) and Section 12(3)(b) of “the Rent Act” are found to be sibling of each other, having a common genus of statutory notice under Section 12(2) of “the Rent Act”. The tenant, by pleading or raising a dispute of standard rent in a reply to the statutory notice, cannot foreclose the landlord’s suit for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. He is needed to prove that he