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2026 Supreme(Online)(Guj) 11037

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Ilesh J. Vora, R. T. Vachhani, JJ
Ashokbhai @ Ashokmama – Appellant
Versus
State of Gujarat – Respondent
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4420 of 2026 | R/SCR.A/4420/2026



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Dharmik G Khadawala, Shatrughn S Soni
For the Respondents: Dhawan Jayswal

Preventive detention under the GPAA requires a clear distinction between a mere breach of "law and order" and a disturbance of "public order"; the latter must affect the community at large, not just specific individuals.

Headnote:(A) Preventive Detention - Public Order vs. Law and Order - Mere registration of criminal cases or disturbance of law and order is insufficient for detention under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985; there must be a demonstrable impact on the community or public at large to constitute a breach of "public order". (Para 5, 6)

(B) Subjective Satisfaction - Detaining Authority - Satisfaction must be based on cogent material showing the detenue is a threat to the social fabric; absence of such material renders the detention order illegal and invalid. (Para 5, 7)

Issues: Whether the registration of two criminal cases is sufficient to justify preventive detention under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, by establishing a threat to public order.

ORAL ORDER

(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)

1. The present petition is directed against the order of detention dated 23.03.2026 passed by the respondent – detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti- Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short ‘the Act’), whereby the respondent - detaining authority has detained the petitioner - detenue as defined under Section 2(g) of the Act.

2. Heard the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner – detenue and learned APP appearing for the respondent – State.

3. Learned advocate for the petitioner - detenue submits that the impugned order of detention is required to be quashed and set-aside since the detaining authority has passed the order of detention solely on the ground of registration of 2 criminal cases, as mentioned in the impugned detention order, and that by itself cannot bring the case of the petitioner - detenue within the purview of definition under Section 2(g) of the Act.

4. Learned advocate for the petitioner – detenue further submitted that the illegal activities alleged to have been carried out or likely to be carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order and at the most it can be said to be a breach of law and order. Further, except the statements of the witnesses and the registration of the above FIRs, no other relevant and cogent material is on record which would show that the alleged anti-social activities of the petitioner - detenue fall under the category of breach of public order. Learned advocate further submitted that it is not possible to hold, on the basis of the facts of the present case, that the activities of the petitioner - detenue with respect to the criminal cases had affected and disturbed the social fabric of the society, eventually which would become threat to the very existence of the normal and routine life of the people at large or that on the basis of the registration of criminal cases, the petitioner - detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for the whole system to exist, as a system governed by rule of law, by disturbing the public order. It is also submitted that the detaining authority has also not applied its mind to the fact that the petitioner – detenue is released on bail in all the offences.

5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and considering the documents and materials available on record, prima facie, it is found that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIRs cannot have any bearing on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations levelled against the petitioner - detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the petitioner - detenue within the realm of the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. Unless and until there is some material to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus goes in peril disturbing the public order at the instance of such person, in that circumstances, it cannot be said that the detenue is a person which would fall within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. Except general statements, there is no other material on record which shows that the petitioner - detenue has acted in such a manner which has become dangerous to the public order.

6. After careful consideration of the material, we are of the considered view that on the basis of aforesaid cases, the authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue could be termed to be acting in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In ou

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