1. Divorced spouse seeks to quash proceedings initiated under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act after settlement and dissolution of marriage, alleging pursuit of ulterior motives. (Para 1 , 2 )
2026 Supreme(Online)(Guj) 35301
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
P. M. Raval, J
Mandeep Rambilas Goyal – Appellant
Versus
State of Gujarat – Respondent
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE FIR/ORDER) NO. 17274 of 2016
Important Points
Subject
Criminal - Quashing of Complaint
Act Referred
Headnote
Issues: Whether a complaint under the D.V. Act is maintainable after the parties have entered into a settlement agreement and obtained a decree of divorce.
Legal Category Hierarchy
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Sunil M Agrawal
For the Respondents: Priti J Joshi, Prerak P Oza, Rohan Shah
Table of Contents
2. Applicants contend the domestic violence complaint is a pressure tactic intended to obstruct custody enforcement, while the respondent argues ongoing maintainability of proceedings despite divorce and remarriage. (Para 3 , 4 )
3. Initiating domestic violence proceedings after matrimonial disputes were fully settled through a divorce decree, merely in response to lawful custody applications, constitutes an abuse of judicial process. (Para 5 )
4. Though domestic violence claims have no strict limitation, filing them after final settlement and divorce, specifically to frustrate a legal child custody request, constitutes procedural abuse warranting quashing. (Para 5 )
5. The High Court quashed the criminal miscellaneous application pending before the magistrate court. (Para 6 , 7 )
6. Does a divorce decree automatically bar subsequent proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act?
Not necessarily; however, initiating such proceedings after parties have fully settled their disputes and dissolved the marriage, specifically as a reactionary pressure tactic, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. (Para 5 )
7. Is the filing of a complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act subject to strict limitation periods?
The court observed that while there is no strict period of limitation for filing an application under the Domestic Violence Act, the timing and motive of the filing remain relevant to determining if the process is being abused. (Para 5 )
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The applicants before this Court have invoked Sections 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash and set aside the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.864 of 2016 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Surat, for the offence under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “D.V. Act”), preferred by the respondent No.2 herein.
2. The brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of deciding the present application are to the effect that the marriage between applicant No.1 and respondent No.2 has since been dissolved by a decree of divorce on 16.07.2015, by the judgment and order of the learned Family Court, Surat. As such the applicant No.1 and the respondent No.2 no more are husband and wife and hence the applicant Nos. 2 and 5 are no more the in laws of the respondent No.2.
2.1. The marriage between applicant No.1 and respondent No.2 was solemnized according to Hindu Religious rights at Ahmedabad on 10.06.2006 and the marriage was also duly registered. However, due to disputes and misunderstandings between them over trifle matters they could not continue their marital relations and they could not live together. In the meanwhile one child was born on 03.08.2013 out of their wedlock. As the differences between applicant No.1 and respondent No.2 became unbearable to each other, Family Suit No.599 of 2014 was filed before the Family Court at Surat as at the time of filing the suit, the respondent No.2 had gone to stay with her parents at Surat.
2.2. During her stay at Ahmedabad with the applicant No.1, the respondent No.2 filed a compliant with Satellite Police Station, Ahmedabad on 19.08.2014 under Sections 498(A), 323, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the present applicants. Ultimately the respondent No.2 realizing that there is no substance in that compliant, on 20.10.2014 withdrawn the same. Thereafter, the applicant No.1 and respondent No.2 filed Family Suit No.599 of 2014 before the Family Court at Surat on 21.11.2014, wherein, after hearing the parties and finding that no reconciliation is possible between the spouses, the Family Court by order dated 16.07.2015 passed decree of divorce and the decree was accordingly drawn.
2.3. That, as per the settlement agreement and as per the order of the Family Court, a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid by cheque No.295801 on 06.12.2014 to the respondent No.2 by the applicant No.1. similarly the further sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid by cheque No.295803 on 30.07.2015 to the respondent No.2 by the applicant No.1.
3. Learned advocate Mr. Sunil M. Agrawal for the applicants would submit that initially respondent No.2 had filed a complaint under Section 498(A), 323, 506(2) read with Section 114 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was subsequently withdrawn on 20.10.2014. Pursuant to that, a settlement agreement was entered into on 21.11.2014, where the parties agreed to settle all disputes, with the custody of the child given to the wife, however, a condition was included stating that if there were changed circumstances, the husband would be at liberty to obtain custody of the child.
3.1. Learned advocate Mr. Agrawal would further submit that upon finding the wife unable to maintain the child properly, an application for custody of child was preferred by the husband and the notice was issued by the learned Family Judge to the respondent No.2 herein. Subsequently, the application filed by the wife under the D. V. Act is merely an afterthought and a pressure tactic to force the applicants not to pursue child’s custody, hence, requested to allow the present application.
4. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Yogesh Manghani on behalf of learned advocate Mr. Prerak Oza for the complainant – respondent No.2 herein and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Rohan Shah for th