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2025 Supreme(Online)(HP) 4855
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Satyen Vaidya, CJ
Kishori Lal – Appellant
Versus
State of H.P. and another – Respondent
CWPOA No.1747 of 2020
For the Appellant: Mr. Raju Ram Rahi
For the Respondents: Mr. Gautam Sood
An authority must provide reasons when denying salary benefits post-acquittal, especially after promotion; failure to do so contravenes established legal mandates.
Headnote:(A) Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules - The duty of the authority to provide reasons for denial of arrears of pay upon exoneration from criminal/disciplinary proceedings is emphasized.
(B) Legal Mandate - Exoneration requires an assessment of circumstances for salary entitlement and reasons must be articulated if denied.
(C)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner promoted post-exoneration sought actual benefits, which were denied without justification.
(D)
Findings of Court:
The court set aside the prior Notification for failing to adhere to procedural mandates for reasoned denial of benefits. (E)
Issues: Whether the non-payment of monetary benefits without reason post-promotion contravenes legal mandates. (F)
Ratio Decidendi: The court reiterated the necessity for authorities to justify denial of salary contrary to established legal precedents. (G)
Result: Petition disposed of; new order to be issued within eight weeks as per legal guidelines. (Paras 8, 10, 12)
| Table of Content |
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| 1. promotion timeline and circumstances of charges faced. (Para 2 , 3 , 4) |
Satyen Vaidya, CJudge (Oral)
Heard.
2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Clerk in Himachal Pradesh Secretariat on 16.06.1981. He was promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f.
31.05.2006.
3. The petitioner faced charges under the criminal as well as disciplinary proceedings. He was placed under suspension w.e.f. 06.07.2011.
4. In the disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was absolved of the charges framed against him vide order dated
20.03.2014. In the criminal proceedings also, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Special Judge (Forest), Shimla vide judgment dated 01.06.2015 passed in Session Trial No.29-S/7 of 2013. H
5. Thereafter, the petitioner represented to the respondents to grant him service benefits, which had been withheld on account of pendency of disciplinary and criminal proceedings.
6. The petitioner wuas granted benefit of promotion to the post of Section Officer Class-I (Gazetted) vide Notification dated 20.04.2016 with retrospective effect from 21.03.2012 on notional basis only.
7. hThe grievance of the petitioner is that the denial of actgual monetary benefits to him from the date of he was ipromoted to the post of Section Officer Class-I (Gazetted) is illegal and no reason has been assigned for denying him such benefits.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment passed by three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. K.V.Jankiraman and others , (1991) 4 SCC 109 to contend that even if the acquittal by criminal Court is not technically considered to be honourable acquittal, still the competent authority was legally obligated to render reasons for denying actual monetary benefits to the petitioner.
9. In K.V. Jankiraman (supra), it has been held as under:- H “26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not 'found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher potst along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/ criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases' where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instancoe of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non- availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned au thorities must be vested with the power to decide hwhether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore however, such circumstances H when they exist and lay down' an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/ criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardize public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz.. "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion", we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum:
"However, whether the officer concerned
