Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 117 of 2025, dated 20.11.2025, registered at Police Station Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2) and 117(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR based on the compromise effected between the parties.

2. Heard.

3. The offence punishable under Section 126(2) of BNS is compoundable under Section 359(1) of the Bhartiya Nagrik Surakasha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, without the permission of the Court, and the offence punishable under Section 117(2) of BNS is compoundable under Section 359(2) of BNSS with the permission of the Court.

4. Therefore, it is apparent that the petitioner has an alternate remedy of approaching the learned Magistrate for the composition of the offence.

5. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent jurisdiction should not be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was observed:

At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:

“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

6. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138, that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (Corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS) is vested in the Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed: -

“8. In order to determine the question under consideration as to what is the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with the object of achieving the above said three results. It is for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers of the High Court, which are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent powers, it has to be borne in mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C. 866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section 482, it was observed that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting it in another form, the Court observed that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject, there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of t